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Preface 
Two years have passed since the publication of the study “Political Orientations, Values 
and Activities of Hungarian University and College Students”. This publication revealed 
tendencies within certain groups of young Hungarians regarding party preferences, voting 
participation and habits, their views and understanding of democracy, as well as aspects 
that have recently gotten more emphasis, such as online activism and self-organization. In 
the publication we analyzed the questions of whether in a democratic system a generation 
of new democrats could emerge, and to what extent Hungarian youth is committed to 
democracy as a system of rule. 
The Heinrich-Böll-Stiftung has commissioned this current volume of the study to further 
examine existing and new tendencies of Hungarian youth regarding their political choices 
and the reasons behind them. While previously only students who reside in the country 
were in the focus, the scope of this recent study has been extended to include the political 
involvement and attitudes of that part of the Hungarian youth who already are emigrating 
or are planning to soon move abroad. The title, “Exit, Voice, Loyalty and Neglect – Politi-
cal Attitudes of Hungarian University and College Students” reflects a possible alignment 
of the various paths of political behavior observed within this generation.
Since 2013, certain trends that were visible in the Hungarian political scene have gained 
even more ground. Recent developments include some new attempts for grassroots activ-
ism, a series of civil protests, and the governing FIDESZ party losing their 2/3 superma-
jority in parliament, but also Prime Minister Viktor Orbán announcing his program of 
illiberal democracy, continuing centralization in the fields of education and administra-
tion, and the far-right party Jobbik becoming even stronger. Meanwhile a large number of 
Hungarians, mostly youth, are leaving the country to continue their studies or to pursue 
a career and life abroad. 
What are the attitudes of youth in Hungary towards democracy, and how active are they in 
politics? What are their party preferences, and how involved are they with public life? Are 
they planning to leave the country, and if so, do they become less or more engaged with 
Hungarian politics from abroad? This study explores such questions and attempts to place 
the findings into a theoretical framework developed for this purpose using the categories 
of exit, voice, loyalty, and neglect. 
We would like to express our gratitude to the editor and authors of the study for their 
efforts and enthusiasm, and hope that the findings of this study will initiate further dis-
cussions of this issue.
Eva van de Rakt                                   Zsófia Deák
Director, Prague office                     Coordinator of activities in Hungary
Heinrich-Böll-Stiftung        Heinrich-Böll-Stiftung
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The structure of the book
The present book focuses on the political participation of college and university students 
for several reasons. Firstly, university students have played an important role in revolu-
tionary changes throughout Hungarian history (1848, 1956). Secondly, members of this 
age cohort are embedded both in the traditional values of their families and in the new 
ideas of youth organizations, and are therefore very sensitive to societal changes. Hence, 
this group reflects and indicates the emerging problems of the whole society at the earliest 
moment. Thirdly, this age cohort is most affected by globalization: the use of the English 
language is a requirement for their studies and there are several international scholar-
ships increasing their mobility. 
The first chapter presents a theoretical framework based on the famous book of Albert O. 
Hirschman entitled Exit, Voice, and Loyalty. 
The second chapter examines the migration potential (Exit) of Hungarian students.
The third chapter examines the attitudes of the respondents towards democracy and their 
political participation (Voice). 
The fourth chapter presents the political preferences of students and their relationship to 
Hungarian political parties (Loyalty). 
The last chapter gives an overview of the results and answers the question whether exit truly 
bars the development of voice – as Albert O. Hirschman states in his classic book - or not. 
*****
Our special thanks to Júlia Lakatos and Béla Bauer for their contribution to 
and comments on a previous version of this study.
Authors who contributed to the preparation of this analysis:
Dániel Oross
Dániel Róna
Tamás Kovács
Andrea Szabó
Budapest, November 2015.
Andrea Szabó
Editor
Theoretical background as per 
Hirschman’s Exit, Voice  
and Political Loyalty
The study of the political market through methods associated with economics investigates 
how the availability of (or the lack of) benefits or the joining of certain institutions influ-
ence the behaviour and preferences of individuals. Perhaps the best known international 
expert on this subject is Albert O. Hirschman, who published his classic book, entitled 
Exit, Voice, and Loyalty, in 1970. The title of the book refers to three concepts – exit, 
voice, and loyalty – used by Hirschman that originate from economics but can also be in-
terpreted in the field of political science. In his analysis, Hirschman basically formulates 
two conflicting options, exit and voice, which he completes with the concept of loyalty. He 
uses the term exit in reference to market conditions, whereas he applies the term voice to 
the world of politics. In both cases his aim is to show that people have several means of 
fulfilling their desires, validating their opinions, or expressing their dissatisfaction with 
a product or system. Though at the time of the publication Hirschman made a clear dis-
tinction between his two fundamental terms, he made some allowances for overlap in sub-
sequent works. Later, in writings published in the 1990s connected to the historic events 
of the fall of the German Democratic Republic and German reunification, he showed even 
more leniency concerning the exclusivity of the two terms. 
Exit, in Hirschman’s interpretation, presents itself in very clear, practical solutions. Re-
fraining from the consumption of a product or switching to another one are the most typi-
cal forms of market exit. In the case of organizations, the practical materialization of exit 
can be resigning. Hirschman considers non-participation in political life and refraining 
from participating in elections to be a solution that has extreme costs.1 
When interpreting the results of our study we started with Hirschman and his aforemen-
tioned theory. The focus of our analysis, however, is grounded in political science. There-
fore, instead of the original politics vs. economics dichotomy, we approach each element 
of this conceptual triad primarily from our own perspective, namely, the attitudes of Hun-
garian university and college students. Our interest is whether the options of exit, voice 
and loyalty prevail in the current attitudes and behaviour of students. We try to describe 
Hungarian students’ behaviour through Hirschman’s terms. Though our terminology uses 
his original analytical concepts, we have given them our own interpretation, adapting a 
theory created over 40 years ago to the Hungarian youth of the 21st century.
Both the relevant literature and empirical social science studies2 have reinforced the ob-
servation that emigration or exit has increased significantly in Hungary. At the same 
time, it is also known from different youth studies that unlike society in general, protesting 
1. It is important to note that as an economist Hirschman primarily deals with the corporate sector and existing capitalism.
2. See http://www.tarki.hu/hu/news/2015/kitekint/20150811_migracio.html or Blaskó–ligeti–sik 2014.
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Under certain circumstances, the correction of the operating mechanisms of the politi-
cal subsystem can be reached not just through protests but by other collective action as 
well.6 Naturally a certain type of passivity is part of collective action, so-called passive 
resistance, when a society gives up cooperating with the reigning power. It is a question 
whether simple non-action, passive agony, or the often-destructive acquiescence belong to 
this category. There is always a large group of any society that can not be described by any 
of these options. Concerning this group, Hirschman speaks of loyalty, while a critic of his 
(RusBult et al. 1982) speaks of neglect. Rusbult and his co-authors expand Hirschman’s 
conceptual triadto include the passive-destructive version of loyalty and place this four-
part concept into a 2*2 matrix. In this system, exit and voice mean actual, de facto 
activity. At the same time, the former is a constructive concept while the latter is not. It 
is rare that exit aids the development of an organization or the strengthening of a soci-
ety. According to Rusbult et al., loyalty can be seen as a passive but constructive action 
that yields some sort of result, while negligence is the least favourable option: Besides 
the fact that an indifferent citizen is passive, his/her non-action is not even constructive. 
They also imply that the appearance of competitive alternatives encourages consumers ( 
in this case, the citizens) to move towards being active, while commitment strengthens 
constructiveness.
Figure 1.
Exit – Voice – Loyalty – Neglect
Source: RusBult, et al. 1988, p. 601 
6. For example, through such standard democratic methods as referendums or popular initiatives. 
the reigning powers is not alien to students.3 (szaBó 2012). In other words, it is as if 
parallel processes were taking place among youth. Then we must mention those university 
or college students who neither leave, nor protest. Is Hirschman’s third important term – 
loyalty – the most fitting category to describe them, or is there some other definition that 
better explains their behaviour?
Let us look at the three basic terms in detail.
Voice versus exit 
In Hirschman’s theory, voice is a part of the correctional mechanism of politics; when 
members of an organization4 – the citizens – express their dissatisfaction to the leaders or 
higher authority, or in the event of a general protest, someone must be willing to listen to 
their argument. Those who protest do not flee when faced with problems, but rather try to 
either actively solve them, or at least to raise social awareness concerning the existence of 
an alternative decision. (HiRscHman 1995, 12; 37) According to Hirschman, voice is the 
direct opposite of exit. He considers voice to be a “messy” term with different degrees of 
exerting its effect directly. He views collective petitions, pleas to higher authorities, pro-
tests, and the mobilization of the public as actions belonging to this group. Effectiveness 
grows in proportion with the size of the action, but disproportionate protest can impede 
the achievement of goals. Voice is a process of interest articulation whose historical devel-
opment is “…synonymous with the history of democratic control.” (HiRscHman 1970, 55) 
Hirschman describes the connection between the options of voice and exit as a complex re-
lationship. According to his axiom, when someone chooses exit, he/she loses the possibility 
to protest, but the reverse is not true5 Voice comes to the forefront if the possibility of exit 
becomes limited. From this perspective, voice complements exit and is especially useful 
from the correctional mechanism perspective. In the political subsystem, exit is the last 
resort - stakeholders only resort to it when protest has been to no avail. The subsequent 
followers of rational choice theory – David Johnson, for example – hold exit to be equal 
to voice; moreover, they prove that from the perspective of personal profit, the option of 
exit may even be more advantageous. David Johnson questions whether the option of hav-
ing a voice is an adequate mode for obtaining change in the distribution of public goods. 
(JoHnson 1999, 172) Voting with one’s feet strengthens the option of exit: If the public 
services are replaced with private ones, then in the case of politics, movement from one 
local government to another costs less than asserting pressure does, so the option of exit 
is more effective for citizens than the option of protest.
3. Students protested against the Hungarian Government’s planned cuts in the state subsidies to finance college tuition in Budapest 
on 10 December 2012. More than 1 000 students rallied, blocking bridges over the Danube in freezing weather, and marched to 
Parliament. The protest later became a nationwide movement and students organized similar actions in different Hungarian cities 
over the course of several weeks.
4. The term “organization” in political economics is always interpreted broadly. In his book The Logic of Collective Action, Olson 
(1997) considers the state a large group.
5. This statement was later heavily criticised by other authors, for example, the essay of Ma (1993) on the attitudes of Chinese 
emigrants who upon reaching their new homes protested against the existing communist regime, helping to promote internal dissent 
in China.
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helping those at home, or following the events of the mother-country. Thus, loyalty to-
wards a country does not automatically cease if a citizen physically leaves his or her 
country of origin. 
Organization: activity vs. passiveness
Due to the above, we hold that the organizational networks through which the young 
adult integrates into society are very important. Our previous research has shown that the 
potential for protest of those young people who are organized into communities is signifi-
cantly higher than for those who are not members of any social, civic or political commu-
nity. (szaBó 2012, oRoss–szaBó 2014) In general, the relevant literature agrees that the 
choice between voice and exit is closely connected to the size of the different groups, as 
well as the action strategy chosen by them in order to obtain the inclusive collective goods. 
(olson 1997, elsteR 1995) In small groups, members have an interest in cooperation, as 
the exit of one actor or refusal to participate has negative effects that can be felt by oth-
ers as well. On the other hand, some members have an interest in providing the collective 
goods even if they have to bear the burden by themselves. This is not the case in large or 
latent groups, however, and thus it is not true for society either.
According to Mancur Olson, in latent groups there are three factors collectively prohib-
iting advocacy; at the same time, it would be in the interest of the individual members of 
the group (society) to take action for the public good. On the one hand, the greater the 
group, the smaller the total profit to the individuals aspiring to realize the interests, so the 
“reward” to the individual for group-oriented action is that much less adequate. (olson 
1997, 52–53) On the other hand, the greater the group, the less each of the individuals 
receive from the whole of the collective goods. Therefore, the likelihood of the probability 
that one member of the group would individually cover the costs of the collective good 
decreases (unlike in small groups). Lastly, the third consideration that forces the ration-
ally-thinking individuals of a society to be passive and to show self-restraint is that the 
larger the number of the group, the greater the organizational cost, and the larger the 
obstacle that it has to overcome in order to secure a certain amount of collective goods for 
itself. Therefore, in latent groups, including society, separate incentives – according to Jon 
Elster, coercive measures – have to be utilized that can be distinguished from the collec-
tive good in order for the rational action of the individual to be group-oriented, otherwise 
the collective action will be passivity and exit. The question arises: Does this mechanism 
take effect in the case of voice, or does something else? Do only those individuals protest 
for whom the event promises the attainment of goods? Is it really due to the rational at-
titude of citizens – if the outcome of the protest appears to be collective goods – that just 
a small segment of society protests? 
Hirschman also calls attention to the fact that protest has costs. Members of an organ-
ization sacrifice their time, money and energy for change to come about. In turn, this 
fact constantly shapes the relationship between exit, voice and loyalty. Voice is a realistic 
alternative if it brings an adequate result, if a significant improvement can be calculated 
in the position of influence or bargaining power. Voice plays an active role in the case of 
particularly important organizations.7 After considering all these, he establishes that the 
alternative of exit impedes the spread of voice. 
As we have noted, the results of previous empirical studies have showed the strengthening 
of the potential for the emigration of Hungarian youth while at the same time suggesting 
that compared to “adults”, their participation in protests is much more robust. (keRn–sz-
aBó 2011; oRoss–szaBó 2014; szaBó–geRö 2015) Though Hirschman separates these two 
categories distinctly, we think they are not necessarily exclusive. A young person can be 
involved in collective action and simultaneously plan to settle abroad. Thus we can state 
the hypothesis that the students can protest AND entertain the thought of exit instead of 
protesting OR exiting. We have to note that in our research – and this is true for migration 
studies in general – we look at potential exit or emigration, which means a future, provi-
sional action. The widespread position of researchers on this is that potential migration 
never matches the numbers of actual migration. Even amongst those determined to leave 
there are some who, in the end, do not take the final steps to do so. When it comes to 
actually making the decision to leave, they stay home. 
Loyalty and Neglect
Perhaps the least specific part of Hirschman’s theory is organizational loyalty. It is no 
coincidence that Rusbult et al. tried to clarify and expand this aspect.8 In Hirschman’s 
approach, loyalty sheds light on the way voice and exit function side by side. Organiza-
tional loyalty holds exit in check and activates protest. Loyalty creates an opportunity 
to stop the deterioration of performance; loyal consumers can motivate a company or a 
system to perform better through their constructive suggestions. Loyal actors can apply 
constructive criticism or can increase the effectiveness of protest by raising the option of 
exit, forcing the leaders of the company or organization to perform even better. 
The concept of boycott also appears in Hirschman’s work. This is a formula found within 
the confines of exit and voice and means an effective exit with the promise of re-entry. If 
the corrective mechanisms take effect, those who have elected to boycott will return to 
the organization. 
The term of post-exit loyalty has become prevalent lately in the relevant literature (san-
tee–eekHuis–zHou 2009). An expatriate can remain loyal even after effectively leaving 
his/her country by participating in the elections of the given country, sending money, 
7. We must note that based on Hirschman, Olson holds that voice is probably most viable where there are few actors (consumers) and 
they are capable of influencing the product for sale. Therefore, in the world of politics and organizations the option of voice is used 
more, as there are far fewer members of those organizations than those who buy the products of companies.
8. Throughout this volume we use the term “indifferent” as a synonym of “neglect”, as it better adheres to youth culture and youth 
behaviour.
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3. We also use the term loyalty, but we do not mean its economic interpretation, rather, 
specifically political loyalty, which we define in two ways. A student can be loyal 
to a political party, in the sense that he/she is a committed voter, but a student can 
also be loyal to the political system in which he/she lives – in this case, democracy. 
That is, there are those who are loyal to parties and those who are loyal to systems. 
Party loyalty can be studied in the form of party preference, while system loyalty 
can be studied through a person’s relationship towards democracy and dictatorship. 
(Politically loyal = passive + constructive).
a. In our opinion, politically loyal students are those who do not calculate their 
individual benefit or possible collective or individual costs, but who, the ex-
clusion of rationality, decide on a given party for emotional reasons, that is, 
they become committed, loyal. This political loyalty spurs the performance of 
the preferred party and helps initiate correctional mechanisms, especially if 
the loyal voters exercise an indirect critique (generally not done in public). Of 
course it is a question whether politically loyal Hungarian university or col-
lege students produce any sort of (indirect) critique, or whether they fall com-
pletely in line with the party opinions, choosing plain, uncritical party loyalty 
over the original and, by definition, critical aspect of loyalty. We have to 
note, however, that those who are loyal to a party may appear amongst pro-
testers as well. Besides voting in elections, the loyal voters of a government’s 
opposition may express their disapproval of the government’s performance 
by participating in collective actions, namely, by protesting. In extreme cases 
it can also happen that the loyal voters of the reigning governing party pro-
test against issues that are not necessarily political in nature or that do not 
question their political loyalty (e.g.,. issue-based protests), but these count as 
rare exceptions to the rule.
b. Those loyal to the system do accept democracy as the best political system; 
their loyalty is basically good-natured. However, their good intentions are not 
paired with a particularly active citizenship. 
4. Finally, special attention must be paid to indifferent students (by which we mean the 
category of neglect. See: Rusbult). These are students not interested in public affairs/
politics during their university years, those who are politically inactive or who have 
difficulty understanding the world of politics. We are interested in the size of this 
destructive student body, but also about whether passivity and uncertainty about 
politics can truly be identified as indifference. We think that indifferent students 
are, on the one hand, inactive; on the other hand, a majority of them are critical 
of the system. That is, these are young adults for whom choosing between systems 
(between democracy and dictatorships) is far from easy. (Politically indifferent = 
passive + destructive). 
We can place the terms used by us in the 2*2 matrix of Rusbult et al. in the following way. 
The expansion of the conceptual framework: exit, voice, and loyalty in relation to 
Hungarian students
Above we listed those analytical, ideal-typical concepts that Hirschman and his followers 
and critics used in connection to exit, voice and loyalty. As indicated, these definitions – 
exactly because of their ideal-typical nature – can not be interpreted directly in the con-
text of 21st century Hungarian university and college students; therefore, we will adapt 
and interpret them. Hereinafter we would like to describe the aspects of the conceptual 
framework used by us, one by one. We would like to note that although we begin with 
Hirschman, we hold the supplements and modifications of Rusbult et al. – which were add-
ed to the original theory in 1988 – to be important as well. We examine the terms in the 
individual active/passive relations, as well as in the constructive/destructive relationship 
of the political system. Being active in this case means actual, realized activity. As our 
research is primarily political science and sociology-oriented and is less inspired by eco-
nomics, when we analyse the constructive/destructive duo we are analysing the relation-
ship towards the political system, to be exact, the relation to democracy. In this case the 
question is whether the action is constructive or destructive from the system’s perspective. 
1. The clearest concept is exit. In our interpretation this means (potentially) leaving the 
country (for the purposes of international study, working abroad, but most often to 
settle abroad.) As we have noted, we cannot measure actual exit, but we analyse – in 
accordance with international studies – potential exit, that is, our focus is directed 
at those who plan to leave the country and settle abroad. Exit is therefore an active 
(actual), nevertheless destructive term, as when it is realized its “benefit” from the 
perspective of Hungarian democracy is marginal. (Exit = active + destructive). 
2. Voice is also a relatively “clear” term, which we read as collective action, that 
is, our use of the terminology tries to follow the original typology. In the wake of 
Hirschman, we hold that not all actions can be categorised as acts of protest, even 
if in theory they are directed at authority or against the past or potential decisions 
of authority. Our analysis uses the term voice in a narrower framework. We consider 
those types of action to be an expression of voice that are capable of mobilising 
university students, or in a broader sense, even public opinion. We do not include 
in this analysis those individual actions that do not come together in some sort of 
public collective action (e.g., donations to NGOs), or that can be defined as instru-
ments of fulfilling individual interests. This is a pronouncedly active category, the 
aim of which is most often to improve the system. This is related to another aspect of 
the concept, its relationship to democracy. We hold that critics of the system – that 
is, those who, under certain situations, can accept a dictatorship in the face of de-
mocracy – also belong under the category of voice. While they clearly express their 
disapproval with democracy – according to our assumption – they still live in this 
system. Aside from this, they also voice their disapproval to varying degrees. (Voice 
= active + constructive).
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Based on Szabó (szaBó 2013), we will call the group of students who hold that democracy 
is preferable to any other kind of government “system loyal” voters. 
The second group in our typology is composed of those students who are characterized by 
a feeling of alienation from political systems, the need for distance from power, and the 
complete depoliticization of their private life. (“For people like me, it does not matter 
whether we have a democratic or non-democratic regime.”) Therefore, during the course 
of our investigation, we call this group “system indifferent”. Their political behaviour 
may be based on collective historical memory according to which the regime changes that 
came about in Hungary appear to have been events that directly affected and threatened 
the lives of individuals, families and groups (eRös 2001). 
The third group in our interpretational framework includes the answers of those students 
according to whom democracy can be overridden by dictatorship under certain circum-
stances (in 2015, 21 % held this view). As their attitude towards democracy is heavily 
critical, we therefore name them “system critical”.
The individual chapters of the book follow this extended conceptual matrix:
· The first chapter examines exit, that is, university and college students who are 
considering leaving the country; 
· the second is about system loyals, system criticals, political indifferents and the 
category of voice; 
· finally, in the last larger chapter, we primarily look at party loyals. 
There are two aspects to which we pay particular attention, examining them separately: one is 
gender, the other is green orientation. We arrived at the latter by asking respondents to choose 
the mentality that is closest to their values/way of thinking from among 10 different value 
markers. Of these 10 markers, one was very distinctive, namely, the green ( environmentalist) 
one, which was chosen by 13 % of respondents. Out of the 10 markers or ideological crutches, 
“green” came in fourth place after the “liberal/free thinking” (27 %), “supporter of order and 
stability” (17 %), and “European/Western-thinking” (15 %) groups.
Figure 2. 
Exit – Voice – Loyalty – Neglect
Based on Rusbult etc 1988 601. p. Szabó.
In the individual chapters of this volume we analyse the relationship between exit, voice 
and loyalty. Ultimately we are searching for an answer to whether exit truly bars protest 
among university students. According to our thesis, as we have previously implied, this 
is not the case. Moreover, we hold that the same groups of active students protest who 
would most likely choose the potential option of exit. Those who are politically loyal do 
not protest and do not choose exit; as a devotee of either a party or a system they do not 
choose either of these categories. We perceive politically indifferent students to be passive 
actors for whom the political system holds no value; they do not devote themselves to any 
group, they do not show any interest in politics, and they do not vote. 
Adhering to international standards,9 we measure the relationship of Hungarian university/
college students towards the democratic political system with the help of the following question: 
“Which of the following statements comes closest to your own opinion? 
· Democracy is always preferable to any other kind of government;
· Under some circumstances, an authoritarian government can be preferable to 
a democratic one;
· For people like me, it does not matter whether we have a democratic or non-dem-
ocratic regime.” 
9. See: Yun-han Chu, Larry Diamond, Andrew J. Nathan, Doh Chull Shin. How East Asians View Democracy, (Columbia University 
Press:  2008).
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Exit: migrant and
peregrine students
Voice: 
those who protest
and system criticals
Political loyalty:
party loyals
and system loyals
Political Neglect:
inactives and
system scepticals
Exit: the international mobility 
and migration potential  
of Hungarian students
Introduction
In the introductory, theoretical chapter of this volume, we described exit and voice with 
regard to two subsystems – market conditions and the world of politics10 – along the lines 
of Albert O. Hirschman’s theory. We also explained in the introduction the context in 
which we are examining and how we define these concepts. In this essay we interpret the 
trends that can be identified in connection to exit with regard to the financial situation 
and political attitudes of the students in our study. 
Our analysis of exit includes the question of the international migration of Hungarian 
students participating in full-time training, which is one of the most current problems 
today. Different aspects and dimensions of migration can be distinguished. Our study ex-
amines the propensity for the international migration of Hungarian students in which 
several different countries are involved, that is, there is a “sending” state and a “host” 
state. (cseResnyés, 1996:20) Based on the reasons for migration, we examine voluntary 
migration, the form of migration in which financial or related considerations (e.g., la-
bour migration, relocating for study purposes) motivate the migrant persons (cseResnyés, 
1996:21). In our study we call the intention for someone to emigrate or go abroad to work 
“migration potential”. Within this framework we would like to know the size of the group 
that plans to migrate within the scope of the studied population and what socio-economic 
factors increase and decrease the migration potential for students participating in full-
time training in Hungarian higher education. (sik 2003:15). Peregrination, study abroad 
means the international mobility of migrant students enrolled in higher education abroad. 
The origin of the concept in Hungary goes back to the end of the 14th century (Béké-
si–Jankovics–kosa–nyeRge, 1993). Mainly members of the nobility could make use of 
the possibility for peregrination in its archaic sense. During these trips they travelled the 
whole of Western Europe and tried to build their political networks as well, usually spend-
ing two or three years abroad. Under the “new” interpretation, this concept refers to the 
migration and mobility of students provided by the framework of the European Union. In 
both the previous and modern understanding of the concept, it is a common element that 
the peregrine is someone, following his/her travels, returns home to apply this knowledge 
in his/her mother country. 
10. Though in a secondary way, exit appears in politics as well, while voice appears in economics. Exit generally presents itself through 
very clear, practical solutions. Not consuming a product or switching to another one is the most typical market “exit”. 
A practical materialization of exit in the world of organizations can be emigration (leaving a country), or in simpler cases, exiting from 
a party. Hirschman considers withdrawal from political life, and therefore from elections, to be a very costly solution.
20.  -  Exit, Voice, Loyalty and Neglect Exit: the international mobility and migration potential of Hungarian students  -  21.
The rise of migration amongst Hungarian students is thus, on the one hand, part of a glob-
al trend. On the other hand, the free movement and mobility of persons is one of the basic 
values of the European Union, and therefore the migration and peregrination of Hun-
garian students is a natural consequence of the European regional integration processes. 
Upon examination of the 32 European countries participating in the Erasmus programme, 
the number of foreign students between 1999 (827,000, or 5.4 percent of all students) 
and 2007 (1,516,000, or 5.7 percent of all students) grew 80 percent in absolute value 
and 30 percent in relative value. Within this, the proportion of students from EU Member 
States grew from 3 percent to 3.3 percent, while that of other European countries grew 
from 2 percent to 3.7 percent. (teicHleR–FeRencz– WäcHteR 2011). Based on the same 
statistics, the mobility of students within Western European states fell from 3 percent 
to 2.8 percent while remaining constant (1.7 percent) in Central and Eastern European 
countries. According to the data of UNESCO, 80 percent of European students studying 
abroad remained on the continent, while 20 percent of them went to another continent to 
study. (teicHleR, 2012:7)
From a European perspective, three groups of mobile students can be distinguished 
(teicHleR, 2012:9):
· Students from low-and middle-income countries migrate mainly to economically 
developed countries with tertiary education systems ensuring high standards of 
education. 
· Students from economically developed countries attain diplomas in other eco-
nomically developed countries.
· It is a characteristic trend among economically developed countries that many 
of their students study temporarily in other economically developed countries.
Although until recently Hungarian society stood out from among the countries of the 
region with respect to the weakness of its geographical mobility, by now it is the sudden 
acceleration of mobility that is a problem. Examining the issue from the perspective of the 
mobility of students participating in higher education, the proportion of foreign students 
within Hungarian higher education grew from 4.74 percent in 2005 to 7.7 percent by the 
2012/2013 academic year (their numbers approached 18 000). The number of Hungarian 
students studying abroad in the 2012/2013 academic year was 9 634, growing from 3.22 
percent to 4.12 percent.
Concerning international trends, we can see that the countries sending the most for-
eign students to Hungary are Germany, followed by neighboring countries: Slovakia, 
Romania, Serbia and Ukraine (that is, countries where many ethnic Hungarians live). 
Hungarian students study in European countries, mainly in Germany, Romania, Austria, and 
Slovakia. Based on this, we can say that the mobility of Hungarian students is regional in 
nature. Out of the top 10 global “sending nations” for international students, only Turkey 
shows up in the Hungarian data. 
Both the relevant literature, as well as empirical social science studies11 have reinforced that 
leaving the country, or exit, has increased significantly in Hungary. Thus, we can state the hy-
pothesis that students can protest AND entertain the thought of exit instead of protesting OR 
exiting. We have to note that our research – and this is true for migration studies in general – 
looks at potential exit or emigration, which means a future, provisional action. The widespread 
position of researchers concerning this is that potential migration never matches the numbers 
of actual migration. Even amongst those determined to leave, there are some who, in the end, 
do not take the final steps when it comes to making the decision, but stay home. Ultimately 
we are searching for an answer to whether exit truly bars protest among university students. 
According to our thesis – as we previously implied – this is not the case. Moreover, we hold 
that the same active student cohorts protest who would also most likely choose the potential 
option of exit. We can only answer this question, however, at the end of the volume, following 
the presentation of the findings for the groups of exit, voice and loyalty.
According to the data of the OECD, upon examination of the global trends of student 
migration the numbers of international students between 1998 and 2004 grew four times 
as fast as those for international migration (Table 1). Since then, the ratio has grown even 
more. In 2009, close to three million international students12 studied worldwide (Findlay 
et al, 2010:4), while according to OECD’s newest data13 today there are almost 4.5 mil-
lion international students studying14 away from their mother country.
Table 1. 
The ten largest sending states (1975–2005).
1975 1985 1995 2005
Country Amount Country Amount Country Amount Country Amount
Iran 33021 China 42428 China 115871 China 343126
USA 29414 Iran 41083 South Korea 69736 India 123559
Greece 23363 Malaysia 40493 Japan 62324 South Korea 95885
Hong Kong 21059 Greece 34086 Germany 45432 Japan 60424
China 17201 Morocco 33094 Greece 43941 Germany 56410
UK 16866 Jordan 24285 Malaysia 41159 France 53350
Nigeria 16348 Hong Kong 23657 India 39626 Turkey 52048
Malaysia 16162 South Korea 22468 Turkey 37629 Morocco 51503
India 14805 Germany 22424 Italy 36515 Greece 49631
Canada 12664 USA 19707 Hong Kong 35141 USA 41181
Source: OECD data, based on the essay of De Wit (2008: 33–4).
11. See http://www.tarki.hu/hu/news/2015/kitekint/20150811_migracio.html or Blaskó–ligeti–sik 2014.)
12. International students are those students who continue their studies across borders. The UNESCO Institute for Statistics, OECD 
and Eurostat define international students as those pupils who do not have a permanent address in the country where they study and 
received their previous degree in another country. If the data for international students is not available for a given country then they 
use the data for foreign students. A foreign student is a student who is not a citizen of the given country. Foreign students therefore 
constitute a subcategory of international students.
13. http://www.oecd.org/edu/eag-interim-report.htm.
14. The event of having studied in another country can be measured with the help of two different approaches. First, the frequency 
of temporary study in another country can be established with the help of surveys of students who are already close to graduation or 
with the help of graduate surveys undertaken soon after graduation. Second, the frequency of “diploma mobility”, i.e., mobility for a 
whole study programme, can be established with the help of educational statistics collected internationally by UNESCO, OECD and 
Eurostat (teicHleR, 2012:8). 
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Table 3. 
 Distribution of students participating in Erasmus programmes.
Institution
Number of students 
travelling abroad for 
part-time training 
(2012/2013)
Number of students 
travelling abroad 
for internships 
(2012/2013)
Total
Budapest Corvinus 
University
360 136 496
Eötvös Loránd University 417 59 476
Budapest University of 
Technology and Economics
286 96 382
University of Pécs 289 70 359
University of Szeged 249 80 329
University of Debrecen 157 90 247
We are therefore witnessing a growth of student mobility in Hungarian higher education 
that is connected to a global trend. Growing mobility, however, has been behind the global 
and European trends in the past years. The extent of mobility is not primarily decided by 
global trends, but by European and even more specifically, by regional effects, as well as 
by domestic, policy-related changes affecting higher education.
Below we analyse in detail how Hungarian students view their opportunities to study, work 
and settle abroad in their own words. Regarding the results of our study, it is important 
to mention in advance that while official statistics typically underestimate the extent of 
migration, forecasts relying mainly on survey methods consistently overestimate it. The 
reason for this is simply that a greater amount of respondents plan to work abroad (or 
usually would just like to, or are dreaming of a “better life”) than actually realize such 
plans in the future. (simonovits, 2014:253).
Research questions
1. What is the migration potential in Hungary among the population we studied? 
2. Are there students for whom studying abroad is a sort of conversion of capital (in 
the Bourdieuian sense?)15
3. Can studying abroad be seen as the first step to moving and later settling abroad 
for Hungarian students, or (in their opinion) will the students return to Hungary 
to work? (Interviews) 
15. Bourdieu’s theory tries to describe the principles upon which the different types of capital (e.g., cultural, social) mutually 
transform into one another. Bourdieu stresses that certain types of capital can be converted into each other under certain conditions. 
In this context, he thinks that along the lines of the law of the conservation of energy that prevails in nature, social energy can be 
conserved as well: Seemingly useless exertions of energy, such as performing free favours in order to retain social capital, are in fact 
rational. When applying for a job, for example, social capital or language skills can be converted into economic capital.
Table 2. 
Hungary and the top 10 countries according to a few highlighted indicators.
The most important 
countries sending foreign 
students to Hungary, 
2012/2013
Most important export 
destinations of Hungary, 
2013
Top 10 sending countries, 
new entrants 2012.  
World ranking
1. Germany 1. Germany 1. China
2. Slovakia 2. Romania 2. India
3. Romania 3. Austria 3. South Korea
4. Serbia 4. Slovakia 4. Saudi Arabia
5. Ukraine 5. Italy 5. Canada
6. Iran 6. France 6.Taiwan
7. Norway 7. UK 7. Japan
8. Israel 8. Poland 8. Vietnam
9. Nigeria 9. Czech Republic 9. Mexico
10. Turkey 10. Russia 10. Turkey
Source: Oktatási Hivatal, Higher Education statistics, Hungarian Statistical Office:  
External trade 2013, Open Doors 2012 Data, based on the essay of Berács et al. (2015: 53–4).
Examining the question in a regional breakdown, while until 2001 Hungary was at the 
head of the Visegrad countries concerning absolute numbers of foreign students and only 
Austria was ahead of it from the region, by 2012 Austria had almost doubled its abso-
lute numbers, Poland (2001: 6659 → 2012: 23 525) had tripled them, while the Czech 
Republic (2001: 7750 → 2012: 39 455) and Slovakia (Slovakia 2001: 1690 → 2012: 
9059) multiplied the number of foreign students by five fold, compared to Hungary’s 1.5 
growth (Hungary 2001: 11 242 → 2012: 17 520). (BeRács, 2015:54). 
The most Erasmus students (616) came to Hungary from Turkey in the 2012/2013 aca-
demic year. Germany came in second, with 557 pupils, France third, with 519 students. 
467 people came from Spain and 373 from Romania. In the 2012/2013 academic year, 
the most students from Hungary per university went to an Erasmus programme from the 
Budapest Corvinus University: 360 students participated in part-time training, while 136 
went for internships.
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Table 4. 
Have you studied abroad?17
University 17
College 14
Secondary grammar school 11
Vocational secondary school 7
Maximum vocational training 5
Mean 11
Source: Active Youth in Hungary Research Group, 2015.
Statistically, gender aspects do not apply in this case, as there is no meaningful difference 
between the two sexes. Similar observations can be made regarding the other aspect we 
highlighted, namely, those who claim to be green; 11 per cent indicated that he/she had 
studied abroad before, which is in accordance with the sample mean. We have to note, 
however, that the ratio of students that have studied abroad within the groups who labelled 
themselves as European/ Western-oriented and liberal is far above average (24 percent 
and 23 percent). Of course, we cannot know whether their ideological orientation is West-
ern or they are liberal because they have studied abroad and they have experience with 
the Western world or owing to other reasons; nevertheless, without a doubt, the factor is 
doubled within these categories. 
Concerning study abroad, 18 percent of students currently attending Hungarian colleges 
or universities plan to continue their studies abroad in the near future for a longer period 
of time. It is important to emphasize that we asked not about programmes that last a few 
months (e.g., Erasmus) but about courses that last one or more years. PhD students said 
they wished to study abroad for lengthier periods of time at the highest rate (32 percent), 
while the smallest proportion was among the group of Master’s students (6 percent).
17. Within the framework of the Bologna Process, the gradual transition from a dual system awarding college-level (föiskolai oklevél) 
and university-level (egyetemi oklevél) degrees to a higher education system based on three consecutive cycles started in 2004 in 
Hungary. At present pre-Bologna and Bologna-type programmes run parallel. 
For more information, see: http://www.nefmi.gov.hu/english/the-hungarian-higher/the-pre-bologna-system
Results
What is the migration potential in Hungary among the population we studied? 
As the first step of our analysis, we study students studying abroad. According to the 
2015 spring survey, 11 percent of Hungarian college students said that during their stud-
ies so far they have studied abroad at one point or another. (It is worth mentioning that 
compared to the last student survey of our research group in 2013, it seems that the 
proportion of students who have studied abroad has not grown, but rather has decreased, 
from 15 percent in 2013).16 This can mean either through an Erasmus Programme – thus 
a programme of four to six months’ duration – or the completion of an entire course of 
study abroad. The proportion of studies abroad among those who are permanent residents 
of Budapest is 17 percent, while in the case of all other students it is below average. 
The higher the level of training sought, the more students go abroad for studies. In the 
case of undergraduate courses this is just 9 percent, while in the case of PhD students it 
is 50 percent. 
It is interesting to examine Study abroad by institutions. We would like to stress that the 
number of respondents is too low to be able to look at each Hungarian institution and fac-
ulty, but we can identify certain trends. For example, among the students of the Budapest 
Corvinus University, the number of students who had already studied abroad was espe-
cially high, but certain faculties of the Budapest University of Technology and Economics, 
as well as ELTE and the University of Szeged, also stand out in this area. Semmelweis 
University’s Faculty of General Medicine should be highlighted as well, where more than 
a quarter of the respondents had studied abroad. Of the state colleges it is worth mention-
ing the Budapest Business School, while of the church-run institutions, Pázmány Péter 
Catholic University should be singled out.
There is a strong correlation between language skills and studying abroad. The higher 
level of language knowledge a student has, the more likely it is that he/she has already 
studied abroad. Among those who have at least one advanced-level language exam, the 
proportion of those who have studied abroad reaches 24 percent. 
A linear relationship can be traced based on the educational attainment of students’ fa-
thers as well. The essence of the relationship is that it is primarily those students who have 
been able to study abroad who were in a more favourable position from the outset, that is, 
those whose father or stepfather had higher levels of education. The proportion of students 
who studied abroad from the group of those whose father had a university degree was 17 
percent, in contrast with those whose father had achieved a maximum of vocational train-
ing, where it was 5 percent. The students could further increase the initial advantage they 
had amassed prior to entering these institutions by studying abroad. 
16. For details of the 2013 survey see szaBó (2014:13–17). 
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The highest proportion of students who plan long-term employment abroad are those with 
permanent addresses in Budapest (close to two-thirds of them), while among students 
living in villages this proportion is 49 percent. The values recorded for young adults living 
in smaller cities are still under the sample mean, whereas the potential rises to 56 percent 
of young adults living in city with county rights20.
Concerning the educational attainment of parents, we received opposite results than we 
expected. In the group of first-generation college students, the ratio of those planning 
long-term employment abroad are significantly higher than those with at least one parent 
with a degree, and is even higher compared to those where both parents have a degree.
Another important factor connected to projected long-term employment abroad is ideo-
logical affiliation. The foreign employment of European/Western, liberal and green-think-
ing students differs significantly from that of youth with strong national or Christian 
Democrat/religious sentiments. While the previous group would prefer to work abroad for 
longer periods, the latter would rather not.  
Settling abroad
The last question dealt with the topic of whether the student plans to settle abroad. It 
is obvious that this is the most clear-cut form of separation from one’s home; this is the 
classic example of exit in the sense of Hirschman. If someone settles permanently in a 
given country, establishes himself or herself there, and starts a family, it is the least likely 
that he/she will return again to make use of his/her gained knowledge and work experience 
in Hungary.21 
In the 2013 survey of our research group, seven per cent of university and college stu-
dents participating in full-time training said they plan to settle abroad for certain, while 
a further 25 per cent said they were likely to do so. Two years ago a third of the students 
planned to migrate. In 2015, the proportion of those who were “entertaining” the idea 
of migration further increased. Currently, 37 per cent of them say that they are planning 
on settling abroad. It is not unfounded to say that survey testing of migration is just a 
“mood indicator”, as It is obvious that one cannot make inferences concerning actual 
actions from survey responses.22 In order to expose how serious the intentions behind the 
responses indicating “wanderlust” are, we posed a separate question concerning what 
sort of preparations the respondent has made for living abroad. 
20. A town with county rights (or urban county, Hungarian: megyei jogú város) is a level of administrative subdivision in Hungary which 
can be considered as a city in some English-speaking countries. All county seats and localities with more than 50,000 inhabitants are 
given this status by the Hungarian Parliament and the President.
21. It is worth noting here that, according to the critics of exit-theory, we can speak of post-exit loyalty as well; that is, even after 
effectively leaving a country, there is still a possibility for a citizen to support it. 
22. http://index.hu/gazdasag/penzbeszel/2013/02/27/mi_igaz_a_kivandorlasi_parabol
Migration potential 
Finding a job will become a more and more serious problem at home – there are 
no jobs that require degrees for the many young adults who have studied in higher 
education. Instead there are more and more jobs that utilize semiskilled workers. 
(András, Berlin)18 
One of the most interesting questions of the study is how Hungarian university and college 
students relate to employment in the future. Do they really want to use the knowledge ac-
quired back home in their mother country, or does their individual and social investment 
pay off abroad? We examined the topic on three levels: short-term employment (of a few 
weeks or months, including commuting), and long-term employment (few years). This will 
be completed by migration, i.e., settling abroad, in the next chapter. 
According to the report by Tárki that we have already quoted, men and young adults 
“play” with the idea of migration more than the average person does.19 The data of the 
Active Youth in Hungary research group reaffirm and support the results of our earlier 
surveys on this topic, namely, that the data foreshadow a pronouncedly pessimistic sce-
nario: Compared to 2013, migration potential has not decreased but instead seems to 
have grown. Close to two-thirds of Hungarian university and college students taking part 
in full-time training are “playing with the idea” of going abroad to work for a few weeks 
or months. Like previous foreign employment, planned short-term employment does not 
relate to traditional socio-demographic and socio-cultural variables either. Basically, re-
gardless of family background, gender, identity, values, or political preference, more than 
0.6 percent of Hungarian university or college students would like to work abroad for a 
few weeks or months.
This data refers to a professedly temporary intent, which (should it be realized) both the 
student who has gained experience abroad and the state can benefit from upon the stu-
dent’s return. The situation is different with permanent employment, where the likelihood 
of return is more doubtful: 52 per cent of university and college students plan long-term 
employment (meaning of several years), 10 percentage points less than the potential for 
short-term employment (of a few months). It is interesting that the rate of undecided stu-
dents increases in this case (from four to seven per cent). 
In the case of potential for long-term employment, significant differences can be found 
between student groups. The two classic fault-lines in higher education, the socio-cultural 
background of families and geographical location, have a meaningful effect on whether 
the student would like to go abroad for several years to work. Gender is not relevant in 
this case either.
18. These interviews have been translated from Hungarian to English; though they have been translated to represent the interviewees’ 
words as closely as possible, because of the nature of translation, they are not exact.
19. The proportion of those wishing to emigrate in April of 2015 is higher than ever before, according to the April survey by TÁRKI. 
Source: http://www.tarki.hu/hu/news/2015/kitekint/20150511_migracio.html. Last retrieved: May 15, 2015.
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Table 6.  
Groups that would like to settle abroad in a higher proportion than the average.  
(percentages)
Name of group Percent
Complete sample 41.5
Left-wing parties 46
Permanent residence in Budapest 47
Not part of any social organization 47
Speaks English at an advanced level 48
„Employment opportunities are unfavourable” 48
LMP-voter 48
Worked abroad previously 49
Positions to the left on the left-right scale 49
„Media cannot criticize government freely” 49
Studies natural sciences 50
Studies economics 52
Studied abroad previously 52
„Does not feel that his/her future is secure” 52
Dissatisfied with the workings of democracy 52
Defines as liberal 52
„Elections are not free and fair” 52
Will certainly refrain from voting 54
Defines as European, Western 58
Source: Active Youth in Hungary Research Group, 2015.
We can see that the highest rate for those who would like to settle abroad was amongst 
those who categorized themselves as liberal, left-wing, and especially European, as well 
as those who are dissatisfied with the current system and feel that there is a democratic 
deficit in the possibility to criticize and dismiss the government. It can be argued in their 
case that we can speak of exit as an act of protest, that is, some sort of desperation or 
last resort, as indicated by Hirschman. At the same time, it would be a mistake to think 
that these are mostly the voters of opposition parties: In the case of LMP24 voters, and 
especially among the ranks of left-wing students, the migration potential was just a few 
percentage points higher than among the overall population. Moreover, it is exactly those 
who are sure to refrain from voting that make up one of the groups reporting the greatest 
“wanderlust”. 
24. LMP [Politics Can Be Different] is a green Hungarian political party. Founded in 2009, it was one of four parties to win seats in 
the National Assembly in the 2010 parliamentary election; currently it has five MPs in Parliament.
Table 5.  
What sort of preparations have you made in order to achieve your plans abroad?  
Percentage of mentions (several options could be marked).
Preparation Percent
No preparation (aside from learning a language) 46
Other 5
Choosing a foreign university 6
Applying for work abroad 8
Applying for a scholarship abroad 8
Searching for lodgement 13
Collecting information about foreign universities 18
Collecting information about foreign scholarship possibilities 21
Collecting information about working abroad 32
Source: Active Youth in Hungary Research Group, 2015.
Even these answers have to be treated with some scepticism, though, as we do not know 
whether the preparations will yield permanent or temporary residence abroad. We can 
assume, however, that a significant part of the students are serious about their plans: Over 
half of the respondents made preparations other than language study. Even the time-con-
suming collection of information refers to the seriousness of the decision, but the real 
indicator that there are quite a few people who will almost certainly leave Hungary in the 
near future is the rate of those who marked “looking for a place to live” or “applying for 
a course”.
Our data and previous studies23 indicate that foreign work or study experience often en-
courages students to stay abroad permanently. A significantly higher proportion of those 
who have already had experience living abroad chose that they would like to settle abroad.
23. http://www.tarki.hu/adatbank-h/kutjel/pdf/b337.pdf
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Those who firmly state that they would never settle outside of Hungary basically mention 
two reasons. On the one hand, family is mentioned (parents, boyfriend/girlfriend), but 
patriotic sentiments are even more important: “I like living here/I am Hungarian/this is 
my home/I belong here/Hungary is my home”. This explanation is especially high among 
the groups of Fidesz–KDNP and Jobbik26 voting university and college students. We can 
also see from the 2015 data that there are very few who would stay home for a practical 
reason, such as career prospects. (Two years ago there were somewhat more people who 
mentioned that the professional possibilities abroad were less favourable, that they did 
not want to give up their life at home, or that they were simply just not brave enough to 
emigrate – however, because of the low number of open-ended questions asked two years 
ago, we do not hold this change to be significant.)  
Are there students for whom studying or working abroad is a sort of conversion of capital 
(in the Bourdieuian sense)? 
Out of 10 people from my primary school in Miskolc only three live at home.  
The rest live in Germany, England, and Scotland. They do not have a degree; they 
left after finishing secondary education. From secondary school the proportion is 
smaller because after graduation everyone got a degree, but 20 % of them live 
abroad. Of my university classmates, 30 % left. In my profession, those leave 
who are from Budapest or who come from a better family background – they 
wish to go abroad more. Those who came to Budapest from out of town and 
their parents don’t have a degree are generally content with the pay they get.  
(Éva, Basel) 
Social privileges and disadvantages can be clearly seen in the area of Study abroad. Those 
students who plan to study abroad for a longer period of time at a higher proportion than 
the average possess significant cultural and financial capital owing to their families and 
enjoy greater personal advantages as well. Just to mention the two most characteristic 
data, 27 per cent of students who have permanent residence in Budapest plan to study 
abroad (as we have shown, the rate of those who already have foreign experiences is 
already higher in this group) while for those living in other villages this is 11 per cent. 
Almost exactly the same can be described according to the educational attainment of 
fathers: 14 per cent of the children of those who have maximum vocational training 
plan to study abroad, while for the children of fathers with a degree this is 24 per cent. 
The inherited privileges accumulate and become further advantages in the job market. 
Looking at the question from the aspect of migration potential, the educational attain-
ment of students’ fathers seems to confirm capital conversion, as it is the only “hard” 
factor that has a meaningful affect on foreign employment. 
26. Jobbik: Movement for a Better Hungary, commonly known as Jobbik, is a Hungarian radical nationalist, far-right political party 
enjoying large (10 – 20 %) voter support. It has 24 seats in the Parliament. The party has been criticized for its anti-Roma rhetoric 
and its support of the illegal Hungarian Guard.
We can see a characteristic difference among the students who vote for the governing 
party, Fidesz:25 only 29 per cent of them imagine that they will have a permanent career 
abroad, while in this regard Jobbik voters are in the middle, with 37 percent. The lower 
propensity to emigrate among students supporting Fidesz may be in connection to the fact 
that they are more confident about their future and see their career perspectives much 
more optimistically in Hungary. Logically, those who consider their employment opportu-
nities to be unfavourable and see their future as uncertain were substantially more likely 
to indicate their intention to leave. The likelihood of migration was also much higher for 
those students who speak English at an advanced level (and/or know another language), 
as well as for those studying economy or natural sciences (this was not higher, however, 
among medical students).  
Finally, we examined the reasons behind emigration. Above all, the reason for migration 
is financial: It is easier to make a living, the living standards are higher, and much more 
money can be saved. Compared to this, all other motivations such as adventure, more job 
opportunities, and the fact that there is family abroad, or even the appreciation of exper-
tise, are much less significant. It is interesting that in our university study two years ago 
almost every fifth respondent planning to emigrate mentioned professional experience as 
their motivation, but in 2015 financial motivations came to the forefront as well. 
I feel that they are making it impossible for me to live normally. The middle 
class is disappearing. I feel that is where I belong – or rather that is where 
I could belong, I have a normal degree with which I could get a good job and 
have a normal pay. It’s just that the conditions are such that despite working, 
despite trying to make the conditions for this possible, it is impossible. 
(Éva, Basel)
Table 7. “Why would you like to live abroad?”  
Percentage of answers in 2013 and 2015.
2013 2015
Financial reasons, salary, savings 37 51
More, better work options 14 16
For fun, adventure 13 11
My expertise is appreciated more abroad 3 5
Because of my boyfriend/girlfriend, family 34 4
To gain professional experience 19 3
Source: Active Youth in Hungary Research Group, 2015 (own calculations).
25. Fidesz – Hungarian Civic Union - is the governing conservative party that held an absolute two-thirds majority inParliament from 
2010 until 2014. Currently it is the biggest Hungarian party with 114 MPs in Parliament.
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Gender increases the odds of migration in a statistically significant way as well, though 
not as much: It is as if the migration potential of men were higher than that of women. 
It is important to mention that age, permanent residence in a village, or satisfaction with 
democracy does not increase but rather decreases the likelihood of migration. 
Table 8. 
Binary logistic regression model for settling abroad permanently.
 B Sig. Exp(B)
Gender (0=female, 1=male) .557 .015 1.746
Age (constant) -.115 .037 .892
Perception of possibilities for employment (1–5) -.258 .021 .772
How satisfied with democracy? (1–5) -.606 .000 .545
Lives in a village (0=no, 1=yes) -.699 .013 .497
Considers green label acceptable (0=no, 1=yes) .913 .093 2.491
Considers liberal, Western label acceptable (0=no, 1=yes) .831 .090 2.296
Position on left-right scale (1–7, where 1= left, 7= right) -.193 .076 .824
Constant 4.110 0.008 60.920
-2 Log likelihood=525.985a; Cox & Snell R Square=0.159; Nagelkerke R Square=0.214
Source: Active Youth in Hungary Research Group, 2015.
In this case, the capital conversion of Bourdieu prevails very slightly. The data show much 
more an ideology- driven exit that depends very much on the given situation. Those plan 
to exit who are dissatisfied with their current situation and can identify with European or 
Western ideas. It seems that inherited socio-cultural privileges do not play a role in per-
manent residence abroad. At the same time, it is worth calling attention to the fact that 
in Hungary, the liberal-Western, green, and leftist orientations can be tied to well-defined 
social groups. 
Can studying abroad be seen as the first step toward moving abroad and living abroad 
for Hungarian students, or will the students return to Hungary to work,in their opinion?
Within the framework of the Active Youth in Hungary research during the first half of 
2015 we conducted a series of interviews with students studying in the most frequent 
destinations for migration (Blaskó–ligeti–sík, 2014:367): Germany, Austria, the United 
Kingdom, the Benelux countries, and Switzerland. In addition to the aforementioned ge-
ographical aspects it was an also important factor in the selection process that we survey 
students studying in both the areas of natural and social sciences.
The distribution of the answers shows a characteristic U-curve, that is, the children of 
fathers with the lowest and highest levels of educational attainment have been abroad 
to work. In our opinion, this means that there are different motivations during foreign 
employment for students coming from socially more advantageous positions compared to 
those from less advantageous ones. In the former category the most important motivation 
could presumably be adventure or willingness to try something new, while in the latter 
category financial constraints, for example, raising money for tuition, could be the most 
important motivation. 
Figure 3.  
Worked abroad? Based on the educational attainment of the father  
where we do not know that of the mother. (percentage)
Source: Active Youth in Hungary Research Group, 2015 (own calculations). 
We tried to validate the results of long-term foreign migration – presented above with de-
scriptive statistical methods – through a multivariate methodology. We created a binary 
logistic regression model and examined what factors affect the intention to settle abroad 
the most. We included all variables which according to our current and previous descrip-
tive statistical experiences could influence migration potential. The model is significant 
and relatively explanatory. (Nagelkerke R2=0.214). The outcome, however, is quite inter-
esting and does not necessarily support the above data. 
Based on the following table, there are five factors within the nearly 30-variable model 
that significantly affect (p≤0.05) settling abroad and three factors that show (p≤0.1) 
significance. We can see that the explanatory variables with lower significance levels are 
those which significantly increase the probability of migration potential, that is, liber-
al-Western and green mentality. 
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The respondents gave very sceptical answers to the question of whether they would return 
home if they could have a position that matched their qualifications there.
· Financial aspects were present in all interviews; perhaps the most characteristic one 
was the comment of a student who has a secondary-school teacher degree:
“If I started teaching at home, the 130 000 HUF27 that I would make is not 
enough for anything, while here even working in a fast-food chain my prospects 
are such that from the money set aside I can go on holiday anywhere in the 
summer, for example (...) [so] this is why I would like to live abroad permanently.”  
(Róbert, Zürich) 
· For others, the prospect of professional development was attractive, for which they 
were ready to give up their job back home: 
 
“In comparison: I left having an office and an assistant back home, I was making 
net 350 000 HUF. At the time I was 23 years old and I didn’t know which way to 
go there, because the profession I had worked in had become jaded. (…) I thought 
that at 25 I’m still young enough to start over again. (…) Back home I said in 
vain that task I had been given was too much work but nobody paid attention. 
They could not hire new people because the primary austerity measures affected 
the employees. If someone left they didn’t hire a replacement. This is how a four- 
person team became two people. Everything doubled - the responsibility, the 
authority – just not the pay. Here, I can build a team around me in a completely 
flexible way and we can discuss everything with the management. Their approach is 
that in order to have success, first you have to develop human resources. You have 
to hire good people; then your success depends on their good ideas. In Hungary this 
is not a concern - just solve things for as little money as possible. (Dóra, London)  
· The interviews confirmed the observations emerging from the survey data that the 
reasons favouring returning to Hungary were mainly personal reasons:
 
“The only reason I would go home is my boyfriend. If he were here, I would stay, 
but he has work at home and his salary is good – he has an open-ended contract. 
There is no position back home for which I could apply – even if there were, they 
would only invite applications because it is mandatory, but they would already 
have decided in advance who would win it.” (Éva, Basel) 
27. As of this writing the exchange rate is 1 EURO to 310 HUF.
Based on the interviews, one of the primary motivations for studying abroad is language 
learning and getting to know another educational system: 
“My primary motivation was to learn English; the other was to write my thesis. 
The big difference in education here is that during the exams they want to know 
what a person knows and how he/she uses that knowledge. The structure of classes 
is completely different, here one period is two hours long but there are two 15 
minute breaks during the period. Within the break there is time to ask questions, 
time for student-teacher interaction. Teamwork is very important, in every class 
there is a task that has to be solved collectively by the group, and the students 
receive a grade for the project as well.” (András, Nijmegen)  
It also became clear from the interviews that the students who consciously want to work 
abroad see their studies abroad as a long-term investment: 
“I came so that I would have not just a Hungarian, but a Hungarian-German 
degree in the field that interests me. Studying was my main motivation; therefore 
I consider professional development a priority in my work as well. Furthermore, 
I can continue to go to university for free here, while in Hungary I already studied 
for 12 semesters, therefore I would have to pay.” (András, Berlin) 
“I decided to apply for a course here last year. I did not primarily come to study, 
but so I could find a position here in London. Of course, everybody said it would 
be impossible, but I thought the path would lead through getting a degree. That 
way I would learn what the professional background in which I would work is like 
here, and then I would start the profession again from scratch.” (Dóra, London)  
Besides this, the most self-aware students work in addition to their studies, which makes 
finding a job easier later on:
“Because I worked here during secondary school the official administration was 
easier for me, for example, I already had a tax number and because of my previous 
experience it was easier for me to find a job. Even so, I had to start my profession 
from the basics - first I did data input, then I handled the archives, finally, because 
I already had experience here, they hired me for my current job.” (András, Berlin)
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Concerning the causes of emigration, we can see from the 2015 data that very few people 
would stay at home for practical reasons, such as career prospects. The motivation for 
migration is above all financial: It is easier to make a living abroad, the standard of living 
is higher abroad, and much more money can be set aside. 
We can see that the highest proportion of those who would like to settle abroad was 
amongst those who categorized themselves as liberal, left-wing, and especially European, 
those who are dissatisfied with the current system, and those who feel there is a demo-
cratic deficit in the possibility to criticize and dismiss the Hungarian Government. It can 
be argued in their case that we can speak of exit as an act of protest, that is, some sort 
of desperation or last resort as described by Hirschman. At the same time, it is exactly 
those who would certainly refrain from voting that also make up one of the groups with 
the greatest “wanderlust”. Concerning whether the exit potential of those who protest 
is truly the highest, or whether exit is truly a “last resort” impeding the development of 
protest, owing to the complexity of the question we will give an answer in the final chapter 
of our essay after we have presented those who have chosen either exit, political protest 
or political loyalty.
Based on the interviews, the primary motivation of those who are studying abroad is to 
learn a language and get to know another educational system, and those who consciously 
want to work abroad see their foreign studies as a sort of long-term investment. Returning 
to Hungary is mostly hampered by financial aspects, while the reasons that favour return-
ing are mainly personal ones. 
Chapter conclusion
With respect to student residence abroad our study found that, according to the 2015 
spring survey, 11 per cent of Hungarian college or university students said they studied 
abroad at one point or another during their studies so far. Compared to 2013, it seems 
that the proportion of students studying abroad has not grown but has decreased (from 15 
per cent in 2013). While the proportion of study abroadperegrination among those who 
are permanent residents of Budapest is 17 per cent, the proportion is below average in the 
case of students who come from elsewhere in Hungary; 18 per cent of university or college 
students plan to study abroad in the near future for a longer period (for a one-year course 
or for a course lasting several years). The highest proportion of students who would like 
to study abroad for longer periods of time are PhD students (32 per cent) while Master’s 
students would like to in the smallest proportion (6 per cent). 
Concerning migration, compared to 2013 migration potential has not decreased, but 
rather increased. Close to two-thirds of Hungarian full-time university and college stu-
dents are “entertaining” the idea of working abroad for a few weeks or months. Basically 
regardless of family background, gender, identity, values or political preferences, more 
than 0.6 percent of Hungarian university and college students would like to work abroad 
for a few weeks or months. 
More than half (52 per cent) of university or college students plan long-term employment 
abroad (lasting a few years). Students with a permanent address in Budapest plan on 
long-term employment in the highest proportion (close to two-thirds), while the proportion 
of students living in other villages with such plans is 49 per cent. Concerning educational 
attainment, the proportion of those planning long-term employment who are first-gener-
ation college students is significantly higher than for those who have at least one parent 
with a degree. In terms of ideology, European/Western, liberal and green-thinking youth 
are the ones who would most like to work abroad for longer periods. 
The most important part of our analysis is the intention to settle abroad, which, based on 
Albert O. Hirschman, we have named exit. According to the data in our 2013 study, seven 
per cent of students planned to settle abroad for sure and another 25 per cent said they 
were likely to. In 2015, the proportion of those who were considering migration further 
increased: 37 per cent said they are planning to settle abroad. The likelihood of migration 
is much higher among those who speak English at an advanced level (and/or know another 
language), as well as among those who study economic or natural sciences.
System indifferents,  
system critics and voice
In the following chapter, with the help of our empirical research, we attempt to answer 
the question of how Hungarian university and college students relate to the democratic 
political system. We study this relationship through two main aspects: On the one hand we 
analyse the question of identification with the democratic political system, presenting the 
results of satisfaction with the conduct of the democratic regime, and on the other hand 
we study the potential for protest among students. During the course of the study we use 
the conceptual framework already described in the introduction, that is, our own typology 
based on Hirschman’s theoretical concept (HiRscHman 1995) and Rusbult’s theoretical 
model (RusBult 1988). In this chapter we write about those who are politically indifferent 
(system indifferent), system critics, those who choose the option of voice, and those loyal 
to the system. 
According to the 2011/2012 and 2013 results of the Active Youth in Hungary research, 
within the sphere of Hungarian university and college students, those who primarily 
preferred democracy as the best political system were the relative majority (39 and 42 
percent stated this respectively). Relative majority means, however, that the democratic 
political system does not have unequivocal support. This is indicated by the fact that in 
2011, 33 percent of university and college students said that for people like them it did 
not matter what sort of political system there is, and 28 per cent said that in certain situ-
ations a dictatorship could be acceptable. This did not change significantly in 2013 either: 
Close to two-thirds (29 per cent) of Hungarian youth still holds an indifferent, sceptical 
stand concerning the political system, while dictatorship continues to remain an alterna-
tive for 23 per cent of them. The results of the 2015 Active Youth in Hungary survey show 
a slight shift in a positive direction regarding the issue. The proportion of pro-democracy 
students among university and college students has grown to 47 per cent, while the pro-
portion of those who could possibly accept a dictatorship decreased to 21 per cent. On the 
other hand, the proportion of those who are sceptical toward the political system has not 
changed. Almost one-third (32 per cent) of them continue to say that it is essentially all 
the same to them what type of political regime is in power. 
Between 2013 and 2015, public offline activity of Hungarian university and college stu-
dents stagnated and even seems to have decreased somewhat. Meanwhile, the frequency 
of online participation has changed in a substantial way. Beyond the analysis of students’ 
relationship toward democracy, in this chapter we seek an answer to what characterizes 
the students studying in Hungarian higher education who actively protest. We examine 
the five forms28 of participation within the dimension of “direct democratic” participation 
28. Out of the following activities, have you participated in/done any?
1. Collecting signatures;
2. Signing political statements, initiatives, petitions;
3. Demonstrations, protests;
4. Spontaneous protests, marches;
5. ...Deliberately did not buy/boycotted a certain product;
40.  -  Exit, Voice, Loyalty and Neglect System indifferents, system critics and voice  -  41.
This means we grouped the replies concerning the content of democracy on the basis of 
the nature of the reply or the approach to the reply. Our results show which aspects of 
the separate normative, theoretical approaches are embraced by different groups as the 
content of democracy.
During the analysis of the qualitative data, we were able to identify five distinct groups of 
interpretations (see Table 9). The different interpretations are distributed equally among 
the respondents. On the one hand this means that the ideas of university and college stu-
dents about democracy are very heterogeneous, and on the other hand shows we cannot 
observe a single approach that dominates their way of thinking about democracy. 
During the analysis, the following groups of interpretations came about based on the 
students’ answers: 
· Legal approach (18 %): This group consists of those interpretations that ap-
proach democracy from the direction of rule of law. Concerning the content of 
democracy, the students belonging to this group primarily emphasize the im-
portance of equality before the law in theory and practice, as well as the im-
portance of all votes being worth the same. Aside from the elements mentioned, 
for certain respondents it was a high priority to voice the principle of equal 
opportunities for all, which besides the legal aspect of democracy includes the 
social aspect as well. 
Table 9. 
Student answers that are characteristic of different interpretations.  
(What does democracy mean to you?)
Legal Majoritarian Leadership Opinion-based Freedom-based
“A system where 
there is equality, 
namely, equality 
before the law”
“The will of the 
people prevails, 
their freedom is 
secured”
“People elect the 
politicians, who 
have to keep in 
mind the interests 
of the people”
“Everyone has 
an opinion and 
everyone’s opinion 
counts”
“A system where 
every person has the 
possibility to attain 
their personal 
freedom”
“Everyone has 
equal rights”
“The goals of a 
community are 
defined based on 
what the majority 
of the community 
would like”
“When people can 
choose their own 
leaders and they 
can enforce their 
will through them”
“Everyone has a 
say in which way 
the country should 
go and what aspects 
should prevail”
“Democracy means 
I can shape my 
fate and I am 
responsible for it”
“Equality and the 
maintenance of law 
and order”
“The will of the 
majority of the 
people should 
prevail”
“The people choose 
a person who 
conveys and carries 
out their will”
“Everyone has a 
say in the final 
decision”
“When someone 
has free will and 
basically acts 
according to their 
own intentions in 
accordance with 
certain rules”
Source: Active Youth in Hungary Research Group, 2015.
(szaBó, 2013:32), six further questions,29 and also online “virtual” participation (szaBó, 
2013:32–33) connected to public issues and social problems. We also identify those stu-
dents who opt out of all forms of participation. 
Identifying with democracy
“I think the basis of democracy is that everyone has a say.” (Dóra)
What does democracy mean? The results of the qualitative survey
We try to outline the relationship of Hungarian university and college students toward 
democracy not just from the results of our quantitative survey, but also from the insights 
of a qualitative study as well. During the qualitative study we conducted 55 interviews 
with university and college students30 in order to receive an answer to the question of what 
they mean when they think about the concept of democracy through their interpretations 
of it.31 Our qualitative analysis stands somewhat apart from Hirschman’s concept; at the 
same time, we think that in order to map the relationship of students towards the demo-
cratic system, it could be relevant to know what content or meaning students attribute to 
democratic order. 
During the content analysis of the interviews, we do not portray the separate groups of in-
terpretations according to the normative, theoretical dimension of the concept of democ-
racy. One reason for this is that even today there is no consensus within political science 
over the normative content of democracy. Researchers may easily feel that they get lost 
among competing interpretations (guttman 1994). It is also difficult to harmonize the 
normative dimension and the content of the replies, because the concept of democracy is 
not just descriptive, but prescriptive as well (saRtoRi, 1999). We also rejected the idea of 
a typology based on theoretical interpretations because the complexity and elaboration of 
the conceptual images of the respondents concerning the content of democracy cannot be 
made to correspond with such separate theoretical approaches. As a result, we interpret 
the different groups we received as “lifeworlds”, content that has trickled down to the 
level of everyday thinking. 
29. Out of the following activities, have you participated in/done any?
1. Shared events, images, videos, posts reflecting your opinion concerning public issues, social problems on social media;
2. Commented on blogs, social media in connection to public issues, social problems;
3.  “Liked” posts on blogs or social media relating to public issues, social problems;
4. … Blogged in connection to public issues, social topics;
5. … Voted on the net on a question relating to public issues, society;
6. … Posted topics connected to public issues, social problems.
30. The interviews were conducted after the second month following the end of the quantitative survey (July 2015). The interviews 
were carried out face-to-face in the form of structured interviews. 
31.The question posed to the students was the following: “In your own words, how would you define what democracy is?” 
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The framework for the interpretation of identifying with democracy
During the study we were interested in what support of the democratic political system 
was like within the sphere of Hungarian university and college students and how they 
identified with it. Accordingly, we interpreted the results primarily in relation to whether 
the respondents prefer or reject democracy. 
As mentioned in the introduction, in line with international standards,32 we measured the 
relationship of Hungarian university and college students towards the democratic political 
system with this question:
 “Which of the following statements comes closest to your own opinion?
1. Democracy is always preferable to any other kind of goverment;
2. Under some circumstances, an authoritarian goverment can be preferable 
to democratic one;
3. For people like me, it does not matter whether we have a democratic or non-dem-
ocratic regime.”
Based on Szabó, (szaBó 2013) in our typology we called the group of students who said 
that democracy is preferable to any other kind of government “system loyal” voters. As 
we have previously indicated, the members of this group are the relative majority among 
those university and college students who have taken a stance. In 2015, close to 47 per 
cent of the respondents chose this statement. According to our typology, their relation to 
the political system is characterized by a constructive, passive, supportive attitude toward 
a system realized solely in connection to a political regime based on democratic norms 
and values. According to our hypothesis, the loyalty of system loyal students is not asso-
ciated with active citizenship. 
The second group is made up of those students who are characterized by a feeling of 
alienation from the political system, the need for distance from power, and the complete 
depoliticization of their private life. (“For people like me, it does not matter whether we 
have a democratic or non-democratic regime.”) During the course of our investigation 
we call this group “system indifferent”. Their political behaviour may be based on collec-
tive historical memory, according to which the regime changes that have come about in 
Hungary appeared as events that directly affected and threatened the lives of individuals, 
families and groups (eRös 2001). Based on the concepts of Hirschman used in our theo-
retical framework, this group has a passive relationship toward the political system; they 
will be those who have a destructive effect with regard to it. Concerning the dimension 
of political participation in our typology, the system indifferents can be equated with the 
politically indifferent community. 
32. Source: Yun-han Chu, Larry Diamond, Andrew J. Nathan, Doh Chull Shin: How East Asians View Democracy. (Columbia 
University Press: 2008).
· Majoritarian approach (23 %): The two main motifs of this group are the real-
ization of the will of the people and that the will of the majority should prevail. 
The two elements are closely linked to each other, as in the interpretation of 
the respondents, the will of the people can be equated to that of the majority, 
and therefore in reality it means the same thing as the will of the majority. The 
main idea of this approach is that the leadership and direction of the democratic 
political community has to be carried out through the application of majoritari-
anism. Thus, democracy is none other than the rule of majority.
· Leadership approach (20 %): The respondents belonging to this approach define 
democracy through the leader-led dichotomy, in other words, the principle of 
representation. The common trait of these interpretations is that they imagine 
the realization of the people’s will in a democracy with the cooperation of rep-
resentatives, elected political leaders. According to isinterpretation, the role of 
the voter is to elect the representatives with his/her vote, who will then have to 
take into consideration the opinions of the voters during the course of the direc-
tion of the political system.
· Opinion-based approach (21 %): The manifestations of the respondents empha-
size the deliberative nature of democracy. According to their definition, the 
meaning of democracy is the ability to voice opinion and for opinions to be tak-
en into account during the political decision-making process in equal measure. 
Based on the answers received, in a democratic order every citizen has a say in 
public affairs and the possibility is provided for each and every citizen to freely 
voice his or her opinion in public debates. 
· Freedom-based approach (18 %): This notion approaches the content of de-
mocracy from the side of the individual, who is at the centre of the conceptual 
interpretation. According to the opinions belonging to this group, democracy 
is primarily about the personal liberties of individuals, the freedom to shape 
individual destinies. Besides acknowledging the institution of personal liberty, 
the respondents also see its limitations, which primarily means adherence to the 
rights and obligations pertaining to individuals. 
Upon examination of the qualitative data we could identify five approaches defining the 
content of democracy from different perspectives. It is important to mention that only 
those students are included in the above-mentioned groups who were able to define de-
mocracy contentwise. This means we not only have to call attention to the fact that a vast 
majority of respondents was able to formulate the meaning of democracy in their own 
words. A significant group of all respondents, close to a third of the students (29 per cent, 
16 people), was not able to give an answer that could be analysed, or simply refrained 
from replying (“I do not know”, “I do not wish to answer”) so a significant number of 
those asked could not comment on the issue in a meaningful way. 
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According to the liberal–conservative scale, the system loyal (3.5) respondents are the 
most liberal, while the system criticals (4.1) are the most conservative. Similar to the left-
right division, system indifferents are situated between the two groups in this case as well. 
The moderate-radical division follows these trends as well, as the system loyals (3.2) can 
be considered the most moderate, while the system criticals (4.2) the most radical. As 
before, the system indifferents continue to occupy the position in between - their results 
are the closest to the average. We think that on the left-right, the liberal-conservative, 
and the moderate-radical scales, the positions of the different groups of respondents are 
explicitly consistent with the stands they have taken based on their relationship toward 
the political system.
Concerning their choices of political values, we asked students to select an idea that was 
closest to their way of thinking from the options we listed. After analysing the students’ 
relationships towards the democratic political system, Table 11 shows which groups they 
belong to based on their political identification. 
It is clear from the results that among those who consider themselves to be liberal, 
free-thinking and European, the system loyal relationship is dominant: 56 per cent of 
liberal, free-thinking students and 62 per cent of European, Western-thinking students 
are loyal to the basic values of the democratic political system and 67 per cent of those 
who consider themselves Christian Democrats and religious are also system loyal. We 
can therefore draw the conclusion that these three political theories typify system loyal 
respondents the most. 
Table 11. 
Prevalence of political ideas. (percentages)33
 System loyal System indifferent System critical
Liberal, free-thinking 56 26 18
European/Western 62 26 12
Christian Democrat, religious 67 24 9
Conservative, traditionalist 36 35 29
Strong national sentiments 26 38 36
Order and stability 34 33 33
Green, environmentalist 40 47 13
Pearson Chi2: 85.640; sig: 0.000. Cramer V: 0.236.
Source: Active Youth in Hungary Research Group, 2015 (own calculations).
33. Due to the low number of items, left-wing radicals (N=7) and Social Democrats (N=20) have not been included in the analysis. 
The third group in our interpretational framework contains the answers of those students 
according to whom democracy can be overridden by dictatorship under certain circum-
stances (in 2015, 21 % held this view). As their attitude towards democracy is heavily 
critical, we name them “system critical”. We also have to emphasize that according to 
our theoretical framework, the system critical category can be characterized by an active 
attitude and they have a constructive effect on the political system. According to our 
hypothesis, both the active and the constructive effect in the case of system criticals is 
also represented in relation to political participation; therefore, this group is likely to be 
characterized by protest. 
It is important to note that the names of the different groups should be interpreted in 
connection with their relationship towards the democratic political system. As we have 
already mentioned, these names represent out typology’s train of thought, which is based 
on Hirschman. 
Choice of political values and support for democracy
In this subsection we would like to connect the question of students’ choice of political 
values with the system loyal, system indifferent and system critical relationships. We wish 
to know where the students belonging to the different groups place themselves along the 
ideological spectrum (left-right; liberal-conservative; moderate-radical) and which polit-
ical values they consider most characteristic of themselves. 
First it is worth examining how students place themselves along the left-right axis. It is 
clear from the table that compared to the other two groups, system loyals place them-
selves most to the left, while we can also see that the further right the respondent places 
him/herself, the more likely he or she will belong to the group of system criticals (4.7). 
Table 10. 
Positions of the groups along ideological scales. (averages)
 left–right (1–7) liberal–conservative (1–7)
moderate–radical 
(1–7)
System loyal 4.1 3.5 3.2
System indifferent 4.3 3.9 3.7
System critical 4.7 4.1 4.2
Sample average 4.3 3.7 3.6
In the case of all three correlations sig=0.000; eta: 0.178; eta: 0.168; eta: 0.282
Source: Active Youth in Hungary Research Group, 2015 (own calculations).
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The system loyal relation is the highest (55 per cent) among those university and college 
students who regularly talk about public issues at home with their family. The constructive 
relationship in their case concerning interest in politics/public issues and family discus-
sions can be detected easily, as these factors show they are involved in the life of the polit-
ical system. Within the camp of system criticals, concerning gender, the proportion of men 
is significantly higher. While only 15 per cent of women could be found in this group, 28 
per cent of men identified themselves as belonging to the camp of system criticals. Con-
cerning permanent address, the proportion of those students is highest within the group of 
system criticals that lives in villages (29 per cent). 
Table 12. 
Socio-demographic characteristics of groups. (percentages)
System 
loyal
System 
indifferent
System 
critical
Gender
Male 43 29 28
Female 52 33 15
Permanent residence
Budapest 56 24 20
City with county rights 49 33 18
Other city 42 40 18
Village 41 30 29
Father’s educational 
attainment
Up to eight years of 
primary education, 
vocational school
36 39 25
Secondary vocational 
school, technical institute 43 36 21
Secondary grammar 
school 44 36 20
College 61 26 13
University, PhD 54 24 22
Interest in public life
1 16 42 42
2 35 42 23
3 42 39 19
4 53 28 19
5 55 17 28
Political interest
1 29 48 23
2 44 40 16
3 50 29 21
4 61 16 23
5 55 12 33
Family discussions
Regularly 55 22 23
Occasionally 46 34 20
Never 31 40 29
Gender: Pearson Chi2: 18.540; sig: 0.000; Cramer V: 0.153. / 
Permanent residence: Pearson Chi2: 21.069; sig: 0.002. Cramer V: 0.116.
Father’s educational attainment: Pearson Chi2: 28.864; sig: 0.004 ; Cramer V:0.136.
Political interest: Pearson Chi2: 67.462 ; sig: 0.000 ; Cramer V:0.206.
Interest in public life: Pearson Chi2: 36.839 ; sig: 0.000 ; Cramer V:0.153.
Family discussions: Pearson Chi2: 16.842 ; sig: 0.002 ; Cramer V:0.103.
Method: Cross-tabs. Source: Active Youth in Hungary Research Group, 2015 (own calculations).
Amongst those with strong national sentiments and those identifying with the green, envi-
ronmentalist mentality, the relative majority belonged to the camp of system indifferents; 
38 per cent of those with strong national sentiments and 47 per cent of those with a green, 
environmentalist mentality belong to the group of sceptics. The data are interesting be-
cause while those with strong national sentiments are dispersed relatively equally among 
the different groups (within the system loyals, their ratio is smaller compared to the two 
other groups), a strong duality can be seen among students with a green, environmentalist 
mentality. As we have indicated, a relative majority of them (47 per cent) strengthens the 
camp of system criticals, but a significant proportion (40 per cent) consider themselves 
to belong to the group of system loyals. As a result, we have to say that the system loyal 
and system sceptical mentalities are both characteristic of green, environmentalist youth. 
Those students ended up in the system critical group who mostly identified as someone 
with strong national sentiments (36 per cent belong to this group) or as conservative 
traditionalists (29 per cent of them are system critical). Furthermore, the ideals of order 
and stability are important for criticals (33 per cent consider themselves to be system crit-
ical). Despite the fact that the above-mentioned political theories typify system criticals 
the most, we cannot say that any political view would predestine someone to belong to any 
group (as we saw in the case of system loyals and system criticals); therefore, there is no 
political idea that is highly specific to system criticals alone. 
Social background and identifying with democracy
In the following we examine what socio-demographic characteristics define the groups, 
divided according to the answers given by the university and college students. When de-
scribing the characteristics of separate groups we used only those variables that caused 
significant differences.34 
It can be said in relation to the system loyal respondents that a majority of women (52 per 
cent) belong to this group compared to 43 per cent of men. That is, concerning gender, 
women are more likely to become system loyals. Permanent address also reveals a clear 
correlation: Residents of metropolitan areas (the capital and city with county rights) are 
the most loyal to the democratic system. The political attainment of the student’s father/
stepfather also fundamentally determines the relationship of youth to the political system: 
The higher the level of education for the father, the greater the chance that the student 
will be system loyal.
The level of interest in public issues and politics also influences which group the student 
belongs to. Upon analysis of the results we can see a linear correlation according to 
which the proportion of system loyal students (55 per cent) is the highest among those 
who showed the most interest in public issues and politics. Family discussions concerning 
public issues also influence students’ attitudes. 
34. The Pearson’s Chi-square showed a significant deviation in the case of gender, permanent residence, educational attainment of the 
father, public interest, political interest, and family discussions about public life. 
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Satisfaction with democracy
During our study we not only wanted to know to what extent students can identify with 
the idea of democracy, but also to what extent they are satisfied with the workings of the 
democratic system, as their attitudes fundamentally affect their position within the con-
structive/destructive relationship toward the system. According to the results of our 2015 
study, 26 per cent of Hungarian university and college students are not satisfied at all, 
while 41 per cent are not very satisfied with the workings of Hungarian democracy. On the 
other hand, within the group of satisfied students, the proportion of those who are more 
or less satisfied are 30 per cent, while only three per cent said they are fully satisfied with 
the workings of the Hungarian democratic system.
The results show that the support of university and college students for the political sys-
tem – be it special or diffuse (or possibly both) – is especially low.35 We presume that low 
support for the system has a destructive effect, while a high level of support for the system 
results in a constructive character. We see the basis of this starting point in the fact that 
while low levels of support may have a destabilizing effect on the political system and can 
therefore have a destructive effect, a high level of support stabilizes the political system 
and can therefore be interpreted as a constructive attitude. 
It is worth examining the relationship between system identification and participation. 
Below we will show in more detail the different dimensions of activity, namely, who pro-
tests and how. Here we merely present the data on online and offline protesters, as well as 
the relationship between the three categories.
Table 13. 
Offline protest and relationship to the system. (percentages)
 
System 
loyal
System 
indifferent
System 
critical Total
Offline protest
Passive offline 49 35 16 100
Protests offline 46 29 25 100
Total  47 32 21 100
Pearson Chi-Square: 9.579a; Sig: 0.008; Phi/Cramer V: 0.110.
Source: Active Youth in Hungary Research Group, 2015 (own calculations).
35. Within the topic of satisfaction with democracy at least five theoretical approaches can be distinguished in the political science 
debate: 
1. Satisfaction with democracy as an indicator of the reigning government (dalton 1999, meRkl 1988);
2. Satisfaction with democracy as an indicator of support for the political system (easton 1965; FucHs–guidoRossi–svensson 1995);
3. Satisfaction with democracy as a cumulative indicator (claRke–dutt–koRnBeRg 1993); 
4. The theory of acceptable duality (dogan 1997; lagos 1997); 
5. The theory of unacceptable duality (Rose–misHleR–HaeRpFeR 1998). 
It is common within these separate theories, however, that they interpret the dimension of satisfaction as equivalent to the dimension of 
support; therefore, the more satisfied the respondent is with the workings of democracy, the greater the extent to which he/she supports 
the system and vice versa. Of these different theoretical approaches, in the case of Hungarian university and college students, we can 
best accept the position that interprets satisfaction as a special form of support, with the difference that special support is based not 
only on government output, but on identifying with different parties, which also plays an important role. 
Upon analysis of the educational attainment of the father/stepfather, we can say that 
among the group of criticals, the ratio of paternal lineage to college and university de-
grees is the lowest (13 and 22 per cent respectively).Upon examination of the question of 
interest in politics and public life, we can see that in this sense, the camp of system criti-
cals can in no way be seen as homogenous: 42 per cent of those who are most disinterested 
in public issues identify as belonging to this group, while 28 per cent of those who are 
most interested in public issues also identify as belonging to this group. When examining 
political interest, the lowest proportion of those that show low interest can be found within 
this group, and 33 per cent of those most interested are from the group of system criticals. 
Based on this, we can say that in this sense, the group of criticals can be characterized 
by a dichotomy: Typically those who are disinterested in questions of politics and public 
issues can be found in this group, just as students with a high level of interest in politics 
and public life can. This means that their influence on the political system is dual as well: 
While we consider those who are interested in political and public issues constructive, we 
describe those who are characterised by indifference towards politics and public life as 
destructive. In the case of system criticals, the frequency of family discussions does not 
affect membership in the group in a significant way. 
Within the group of system indifferent respondents there is no significant divergence re-
garding the proportion of men and women; 29 per cent of men and 33 per cent of women 
belong to this category of respondents. Within the group of sceptics, concerning per-
manent address, the rural small and mid-size cities predominate, while concerning the 
educational attainment of fathers, the rate of those whose father has the lowest level of 
education is the highest in the case of the system indifferents (39 per cent). 
Upon examination of their public and political interests, it can be said that this group of 
respondents is the most indifferent toward this issue. Those who are not interested in pub-
lic issues at all (42 per cent) can be found in the highest proportion among the group of 
indifferents, together with those that are completely uninterested in politics (48 per cent). 
Also the smallest proportion of those who show an especially high interest towards both 
the worlds of politics and public life are in this group as well. 
With regard to family discussions about questions of public life, we can say that 40 per 
cent of those students who said that during discussions at home public issues are never 
brought up belong to the group of system criticals. Therefore we find it likely that, in 
the sense of Hirschman, the system indifferents will be characterized by a passive and 
destructive approach. 
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The system indifferent group, on the other hand, has to be destructive, which in this case 
means they will be specifically dissatisfied with the workings of democracy and therefore 
support for the democratic order will be low within their sphere. Based on the typology 
presented in the introduction, the system criticals are also characterized by a construc-
tive nature, but it can easily be that their activity is due precisely to their dissatisfaction; 
therefore, in their case, satisfaction with democracy does not necessarily have to appear. 
At the same time, the results of research are that our theoretical expectations do not 
necessarily correspond to reality. First of all, it should be underlined that there are no 
significant differences between the ways the groups think. They are very similar in their 
dissatisfaction. 
Our theoretical premise does not hold its ground in the case of system loyals, as they are 
no more satisfied than their counterparts. Also, we cannot say, in the case of system indif-
ferents, that they would be more dissatisfied than others; moreover, the highest proportion 
of more or less satisfied students is in the group of indifferents. In the case of system criti-
cals, dissatisfaction does not contradict our premise; their constructive nature depends on 
what approach they take to the active/passive relationship, that is, whether those belong-
ing to the category of voice do actually protest. After reviewing the results, for the time 
being it seems that in the case of system loyals, system indifferents, and system criticals, 
dissatisfaction with the workings of democracy does not have sufficient explanatory value, 
as the replies received from the students show a pronouncedly inconsistent result. 
The social dimension of satisfaction
Here we present our findings on satisfaction with the workings of democracy as viewed 
through the financial situations and future prospects of students. Our premise is that the 
socio-economic situation of university students has an impact on their assessment of their 
satisfaction with democracy.
Of the variables examined, we can speak of significant divergence (p≤0.05) when it comes 
to the subjective evaluation of students’ financial situations and their perception of future 
prospects. Though our data set contains the subjective perceptions of possibilities for 
employment among university and college students, there is no significant difference with 
respect to this among the students who evaluate their levels of satisfaction differently. 
As we can see in the above table, system criticals are somewhat overrepresented among 
those protesting offline: In the sample, their weight is 21 per cent, while among offline 
protesters it is 25 per cent. However, system indifferents and system loyals represent a 
higher proportion than the sample mean among the group of passive students.In the case 
of online protest activity our premise can be similarly verified, adding that the system 
indifferents appear among the group of online passives with even more weight.
Table 14.  
Online protest and relationship to the system. (percentages)
 
System 
loyal
System 
indifferent
System 
critical Total
Online protest
Passive offline 48 35 15 100
Protests offline 47 29 25 100
Total  47 32 21 100
Pearson Chi-Square:11.685; Sig: 0.003; Phi/Cramer’s V: 0.122.
Source: Active Youth in Hungary Research Group, 2015 (own calculations).
Thus, system criticals have relatively large weight among offline and online protesters as 
well, while system indifferents rather “strengthen” the passive side. System criticals seem 
to have some sort of voice, but it is by no means exceptionally high.
In the following we present what factors lie behind satisfaction and dissatisfaction. On the 
one hand, we show the political dimension of satisfaction with the workings of Hungari-
an democracy, while on the other hand we wish to analyse the possible financial aspects 
of satisfaction. During the analysis of the political dimension we follow the three group 
categories, while during the analysis of the financial aspects we would like to know how 
subjective assessment of the financial situation and the perspectives of students concern-
ing the future, as well as their opinions on future employment, affect their satisfaction 
with Hungarian democracy. 
Satisfaction within the sphere of system loyals, system indifferents,  
and system criticals
We begin the analysis of the dimension of satisfaction with the groups of respondents 
previously described. According to Hirschman, as well as to our typology, the system loyal 
group should be characterized by a constructive nature, which in this case means satisfac-
tion with democracy, and therefore a high level of support for it. 
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We are in a somewhat easier situation concerning the students’ views of the future, as 
we can see a linear relationship that is relatively easy to interpret. The results show that 
those students who see their future as more certain can be found in a smaller proportion 
among the completely dissatisfied group and in greater numbers among those university 
and college students who are more or less satisfied. We also have to highlight that, similar 
to the financial situation, a secure future is only able to alleviate dissatisfaction with de-
mocracy, as 64 per cent of those who see their future as most certain are also dissatisfied 
with the workings of the democratic order. It is an interesting point that a third of those 
who see their future as the most stable belong to the group of most dissatisfied students. 
Without drawing far-reaching conclusions that cannot be confirmed by our results, we 
presume that this group may be characterized by heightened financial and social expec-
tations; therefore, their disappointment regarding the performance of democracy appears 
to a greater extent.
As we mentioned before, based students’ assessments we cannot speak of a significant 
effect of employment possibilities here. However, it is definitely worth mentioning that 41 
per cent of those university and college students who gave the most negative assessment 
concerning the topic of employment possibilities are not at all satisfied with the workings 
of democracy.
To summarize, the financial dimension of satisfaction with democracy is defined to the 
greatest extent by the financial situation of students and their outlook for the future. Those 
university and college students are the most dissatisfied who live in the most difficult fi-
nancial circumstances and see their future as the most uncertain. It is also important to 
highlight that though those students who live in better financial circumstances and have 
more certain futures are more satisfied with the performance of democracy, nevertheless, 
an overwhelming majority of them still belong to the group of unsatisfied students. 
Voice: those who protest
As we have described in the theoretical introduction, based on Hirschman’s theory and 
concepts, we hold those to belong in the category of voice who do not flee when faced with 
problems, but rather try to either actively solve them or at least to raise social awareness 
concerning the existence of an alternative decision. We consider collective petitions, pleas 
to higher authorities, protests and the mobilization of the public as actions belonging to 
the category of voice. (HiRscHman 1995, 12; 37). In the following, using the data of the 
Active Youth in Hungary Research Group examining the five forms of participation in the 
dimension of “direct democratic” participation (szaBó, 2013:32), as well as six further 
questions and “virtual” participation (szaBó, 2013:32–33) connected to online, public 
and social problems, we seek answers to what characterizes those students participating 
in Hungarian higher education who actively protest.
Table 15.  
The proportion of social dimension elements within the groups 
of satisfaction levels. (percentages)
 
I’m not 
satisfied 
at all
I’m not 
really 
satisfied
I’m more 
or less 
satisfied
I’m 
completely 
satisfied
Subjective 
financial 
situation
I do not have financial 
worries 28 34 33 5
I make ends meet by 
budgeting well 23 44 31 2
I can just make ends meet 
from my salary 28 44 24 4
I have financial problems 
every month,  
I live in deprivation 
60 38 2 0
View of the 
future
Not at all certain 48 35 17 -
2 38 46 14 2
3 24 45 25 3
4 21 41 35 3
Very certain 33 31 31 5
Subjective financial situation: Pearson Chi2: 22.913; sig: 0.028; Cramer V:0.098.
View of the future: Pearson Chi2: 32.321, sig: 0.001. Cramer V: 0.116.
Source: Active Youth in Hungary Research Group, 2015 (own calculations).
According to the subjective financial situation results, those students are the most dissatis-
fied with the workings of democracy who are forced to live among the most difficult finan-
cial circumstances: 50 per cent of those students getting by from one month to the other or 
living in deprivation are not at all satisfied, while 38 per cent of them are not really satisfied 
with the workings of the Hungarian democratic order. The students living in the worst finan-
cial circumstances are the most critical, but this does not mean that university and college 
students with good financial situations are satisfied. Despite the fact that approximately a 
third of the students who “have no financial worries” (33 per cent) and who “make ends 
meet by budgeting well” (31 per cent) are more or less satisfied with the workings of de-
mocracy, a vast majority of them (62 and 67 per cent, respectively) nevertheless strengthen 
the camp of those who are dissatisfied. The relevant difference is that while the majority of 
those who live in difficult financial circumstances are not at all satisfied, in the case of those 
living in good financial circumstances, the same is true for only that smaller part of such 
students who are dissatisfied. This means that good financial circumstances can only mod-
erate dissatisfaction with the workings of democracy but will not have a more substantial 
effect on it. It is also noteworthy that the weight of those who are completely satisfied with 
the workings of democracy in all financial groups is irrelevant. 
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If we examine this through a binary logistic model,38 we can find the most important 
factors affecting such organization. It can be seen from the table below that in the case of 
religious, churchgoer students, the likelihood of someone having some form of organiza-
tion is 8.44 times greater. In this context, the likelihood of organization among those who 
identify with the value labels of Christian Democrat/religious/conservative is significantly 
higher as well. We can also see, however, that there is another ideological label that has 
strong influence on connection to such organizations, and that is green orientation. Ac-
cording to the data, the likelihood of organization is 6.19 times greater for youth accept-
ing green values. Our 2015 survey therefore confirmed our earlier belief (oRoss–szaBó 
2014) that religious education in Hungary is a community-building force present in choice 
of values (Christian Democrat, conservative) and in increased social engagement. We 
can also confirm the results of the first wave of our research (keil 2012) that there are 
organized students interested in public life on the progressive side as well, not just among 
conservatives, who most identify wit the “green” label. 
Organization is associated with being open to social problems, and we can also see from 
the following data set that, at the same time, the likelihood of organization among youth 
who are satisfied with democracy, who are system indifferent and who are participating 
in university or college level training is smaller. Perhaps it is no exaggeration to presume 
that these data indicate organization is related to some sort of general dissatisfaction. Of 
the different study areas, those in the legal and technical sciences showed negative values 
within the following Table39.
Table 16. 
Binary logistic regression model of organization
 B Sig. Exp(B)
Churchgoing religious (dummy) 2.134 .000 8.45
Green (dummy) 1.822 .003 6.19
Christian Democratic/ conservative/ religious (dummy) 1.834 .004 6.26
Openness to social problems (1–5) .295 .007 1.34
Legal studies (dummy) -1.648 .022 .19
System indifferent (dummy) -.570 .036 .57
Holding a Bachelor’s degree (dummy) -1.189 .050 .30
Satisfied with democracy (dummy) -.235 .061 .79
Technical studies (dummy) -.684 .091 .51
Source: Active Youth in Hungary Research Group, 2015 (own calculations).
38. The statistics of the model: Nagelkerke R Square: 0.282; -2 Log likelihood: 776.993; Cox & Snell R Square: 0.208.
39. We have to mention, however, that in the case of technical students, the level of significance exceeded the level of p≤0.05 but 
did not reach p≤0.1. 
Organization of Hungarian university students
As we have alluded to in our previous studies, the activity of Hungarian university and col-
lege students concerning public matters is somewhat higher than the previous large-scale 
youth studies indicated (szaBó–oRoss 2014). This activity, however, is very limited with 
respect to political organization and is aimed much more at leisure activities. In 2015, 
as was the case two years ago, sports clubs were the key element of the organizational 
networks of youth, which it would be an exaggeration to classify as political in nature. 
The second most popular form of organization is professional, scientific organizations, 
to which almost every fifth student is connected. This is followed by cultural groups, or-
ganizations for the preservation of heritage, artistic groups, church groups and religious 
communities. Compared to 2013, the rate of involvement in environmentalist groups has 
grown, and the proportion of those related to local student bodies (HÖK)36 rose above 10 
per cent. All other organization – all in all we listed 12 types of organizational forms – 
was less relevant; two per cent of university or college students are involved with a youth 
organization of a political party or with a political party itself.  
Organization according to public issues
If we just examine the types of organizations relating to public life (eight types)37 the 
level of student organization is much lower, as 60 per cent of Hungarian university or 
college students have absolutely no connection with such public or political organizations. 
A quarter of them are connected to such an organization and a tenth of them are connect-
ed to two organizations dealing with issues concerning the public (the index of average 
membership in organizations related to public life=0.59, where 0 is no organizational 
connection and 8 means someone is involved in all forms of organization). 
Organization of students according to public issues – like the above-mentioned connec-
tions – is less related to traditional socio-cultural and socio-demographic factors, but 
depends on ideological orientationto a great extent. The average organization of Chris-
tian Democrat, religious youth is the highest (1.32 index points), followed by those who 
identify as green/environmentalists (0.84 index points). The level of organization of no 
other group exceeds the average value. In line with their values and ideological attitudes, 
those who identify as rather right-wing and ideologically conservative – and therefore are 
Fidesz voters – are more organized than average. There is no significant difference in this 
sense between opposition voters and those situated on the moderate-radical axis. 
36. HÖOK (the National Union of Hungarian Students) represents approximately 400 000 students around the country. It has a right 
to express its opinion and to make proposals about any questions concerning higher education. The historical predecessor to HÖOK 
was MEFESZ, which played an active role in the Revolution of 1956 when Hungarians revolted against communist oppression. HÖOK 
completes national-level tasks regarding higher education and youth policy that cannot be carried out at the institutional or regional 
levels. The National Union of Hungarian Students has a local student union (HÖK) in every higher education institution in Hungary.
37. These are: The HÖK; other student organizations; church organizations/ religious communities; human rights movement or 
organization; youth organization of a political party; ecological/ environmentalist organization; and other organizations dealing with 
public affairs that are not parties. 
56.  -  Exit, Voice, Loyalty and Neglect System indifferents, system critics and voice  -  57.
Table 17. 
Collective (offline) participation among Hungarian university  
and college students between 2013 and 2015. (percentages)
2013 2015
No participation 34 41
One 27 30
Two 19 18
3 or more 20 11
100 100
Source: Active Youth in Hungary Research Group, 2015 (own calculations).
We are in the lucky position that, parallel to the study of the Active Youth in Hungary Re-
search Group, a sociological survey representative of the whole of Hungarian society was 
carried out that examined participation – including direct democratic participation40 – 
with a similar methodology. We have at our disposal some comparative data we can use to 
interpret the extent of Hungarian university and college students’ collective participation.
From the study of Andrea Szabó and Márton Gerö, we can see that 5 per cent of the 
Hungarian population above 18 (without university and college students in the sample) 
signed letters of protest or petitions in traditional or web formats (szaBó–geRö 2015), 
two per cent participated in legal protests and three per cent deliberately boycotted or did 
not buy certain products. The 2015 Active Youth in Hungary Research found the activity 
of students’ magnitudes higher than the potential for protest among the total population 
of the country. Despite the fact that their activity has significantly decreased over two 
years, university and college students are one of the most active, if not the most active, 
strata in Hungary. 
Who are we talking about, though? How can the higher education groups that protest be 
defined? Can we confirm the theoretical hypothesis in our introduction, based mainly on 
Olson, according to which organization and connection to different social groups strength-
ens political activity? 
Involvement in different forms of collective action is independent of gender or type of per-
manent address. That is, male and female students, those who live in Budapest, and those 
living outside of the capital participate to the same extent. The socio-cultural background 
of the student’s family and its financial situation does not have significant relevance ei-
ther. The extent of protest among students attending institutions maintained by different 
organizations is different, however. 
40. The OTKA K 108836 study titled Integrációs és dezintegrációs folyamatok a magyar társadalomban (Integrational and 
disintegrational processes in Hungarian society). Director of Research: Kovách Imre, Dsc. For detailed results of the study, see: 
(szaBó–geRö 2015).
In his now-classic study, Albert O. Hirschman primarily called collective forms of action 
voice. In our research we look at 14 offline and six online forms of participation, but some 
of these do not correspond to Hirschman’s use of the concept, for example because they 
are not collective actions, or because they are activities connected much more to elections 
than to protest. Therefore in our detailed analysis we look at five direct democratic and 
six online forms of activity under the analysis of voice.
As we indicated in the introduction, those who protest do not flee when faced with problems, 
but rather try to either actively solve them or at least to raise social awareness concerning 
the existence of an alternative decision. (HiRscHman 1995, 12; 37) According to Hirschman, 
voice is a concept that has different levels, and has a direct effect. He views collective pe-
titions, pleas to higher authorities, protests and the mobilization of the public as actions 
of voice. In our opinion, this all clearly indicates the so-called repertoire of collective ac-
tion that we considered direct democratic participation in our earlier studies (szaBó–oRoss 
2012; oRoss–szaBó 2014; szaBó 2014). Hirschman describes forms of participation which, 
on the one hand, indicate especially strong involvement and on the other hand are capable of 
mobilising society, or in this case, student citizens. We think it is not by chance that he uses 
the term voice to describe protests instead of the term “demonstration”. 
Thus, in this subsection, by voice we mean those who participate in collective, direct 
democratic actions such as collecting signatures for a petition (27 %), signing petitions, 
referendum initiatives (29 %), participating in legal demonstrations (20 %), spontaneous 
protests, marches (9 %), as well as intentional boycotts (20 %). We analyse those who 
participate in online actions in a separate subsection. 
The following table shows the proportion of protests (in the sense of Hirschman) in 2013 
and 2015. Within two years, significant changes happened concerning the five repertoire 
types examined. The voice of Hungarian university and college students became more 
subdued and moderate as the proportion of those who do not engage in any form of ac-
tivity increased significantly (from 34 % to 41 %). In 2015, 59 per cent of students can 
be seen as belonging to the category of voice. The proportion of those who participated in 
three or more protests also decreased significantly and we can therefore speak of a double 
decrease: Fewer students participated in less protests according to the 2015 studies (av-
erage participation index 2013: 1.4 index points; 2015: 1.0 index points).  
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Table 18. 
The binary logistic regression model of protest.
 B Sig. Exp(B)
Is publicly organized (dummy) .678 .000 1.971
System critical (dummy) .591 .024 1.806
Interested in politics (1–5) .199 .030 1.220
Satisfied with democracy (dummy) -.312 .008 .732
Does not know which party to vote for (dummy) -1.100 .031 .333
Source: Active Youth in Hungary Research Group, 2015 (own calculations).
We described in the introduction that in our opinion, system critical (those who could 
accept dictatorship under certain circumstances instead of democracy) also belong to the 
category of voice. While they clearly express their disapproval of democracy (according to 
our assumption) they still live in such a system, and therefore they also voice their disap-
proval to varying degrees. From the logistic regression model above, we can see that the 
so-called system criticals make up an important group of those who protest. What about 
the system criticals and system loyals, though? 
We examined their relation to voice and democracy through a two-dimensional cross-
tabulation analysis. As the following table indicates, the attitudes of system criticals are 
truly different than that of students belonging to the other two categories, as close to 
seven-tenths of them report some form of activity. The most passive (as expected) are the 
system indifferents, but the activity of system loyals is also below average. However, those 
students who can accept that “Under some circumstances, an authoritarian goverment 
can be preferable to democratic one” (according to our presumption) generally voice 
their displeasure. This definitely indicates an attitude toward democracy that is actively 
dismissive. 
Table 19. 
Protest and relationship to the system. (percentages)
 
System 
loyal
System 
indifferent
System 
critical Total
Offline collective 
protest
Dos not protest 43 46 31 41
Protests’ 57 54 69 59
Total  100 100 100 100
Pearson Chi-Square: 9.579; Sig: 0.008; Phi/Cramer V: 0.110. 
Source: Active Youth in Hungary Research Group, 2015 (own calculations).
More than one-fifth of students at state-financed big universities protest (62 %) while only 
one-third of students attending private colleges and universities do (34 %). It is worth 
indicating that among the students of church universities who are the most organized, the 
frequency of collective action is below average (49 %). 
The data indicate that those students protest who are open to social problems and issues 
and are interested in events taking place outside of their lifeworld. 81 per cent of those 
who are very interested in social problems and half of those who are not interested at all 
can be seen as belonging to the category of voice, and similar proportions can be seen 
concerning those interested in (party)politics (79 % vs. 53 %). 
Several signs indicate the oppositional nature of participation in collective action. Those 
students who do not see their as future certain at all, or who see it as uncertain, protest 
more frequently than the average; 82 per cent of those who placed themselves on the liber-
al side within the liberal-conservative scale indicated participation in at least one type of 
collective action, while among those who stood in the middle, this proportion was around 
54 per cent. The position on the moderate-radical scale indicates a similar phenomenon, 
as 80 per cent of radicals, 53 per cent of those in the middle, and 65 per cent of those 
on the moderate side protested at one time or another. Significant correlations cannot be 
found, however, between these separate value and ideological labels. 
We tested the factors affecting the extent of participation in collective action, with an em-
phasis on connection to organizations dealing with public issues, through a binary regres-
sive model as well. In our model, the combination of the previously-mentioned five forms 
of participation were dependant variables (0 did not participate in anything, 1 did in at 
least one collective activity), while the set of independent variables embraced those ques-
tions we examined previously (socio-demographic and socio-cultural background, specific 
university/college questions, political/ideological orientation, and of course, connection to 
organizations dealing with public issues). 
Based on the following binary logistic regression41 the greatest effect on protest is the 
connection to organizations dealing with public issues: The likelihood of someone protest-
ing is close to twice as high if he/she is connected to an organization. Therefore, those 
students who are socially integrated show much higher activity than those who are not 
connected to civil actors. Based on this, it is not surprising that the protest potential is 
stronger for those students who are interested in politics, as interest and openness are 
necessary for participation. In the sense of Hirschman, a smaller group of students can 
be considered as belonging to the category of voice, those whose public activity closely 
follows other dimensions of social integration.  
The data also show that there is some sort of opposition charge to protest potential. The 
likelihood of collective action is lower among those who are satisfied with the current 
performance of democracy. At the same time, the odds of participatory activity among the 
system critical groups are 1.806. It is worth examining this last aspect in detail. 
41. Nagelkerke R Square: 0.166; -2 Log likelihood: 858.808; Cox & Snell R Square: 0.123.
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The proportion of those writing a public issues-themed blog proved to be the least fre-
quently reported among the categories (4 %). In 2015 the proportion of those not involved 
in online participation was 38 per cent. 
Figure 4. 
Online participation in 2015. (“Yes” answer, percentages)
Source: Active Youth in Hungary Research Group, 2013 and 2015 (own calculations).
The two main questions of the subcategory are a) whether online participation truly makes 
it possible to involve new groups and b) what can be associated with students’ intention 
to participate virtually? In order to answer the first question, we chose three socio-demo-
graphic variables, three variables connected to living circumstances, and two ideological 
variables and examined whether the same groups would be found in higher proportions 
among both offline and online participants. We restricted offline participation, according 
to Hirschman’s categories, to collective participation. If there is a substantive change and 
the universe of online and offline protesters changes, then we can say that new groups 
might be integrated through online participation.42 As the proportion of online partici-
pation is three per cent higher than that of collective participation, we considered such 
change substantive if it reached or surpassed twice that, i.e., six per cent. In addition, it is 
worth exploring whether, in the case of the given question, there is a significant difference 
between the separate categories of replies. 
42. Offline collective and online participation came about in the table based on 5–5 forms of participation.
Virtual participation
There is no consensus in the literature as to what constitutes online participation. Some 
social scientists believe that online participation is not an individual branch of participa-
tion but is no more than a technically new solution for traditional and collective forms of 
participation (BakkeR–de vReese, 2011). This is contrasts with perceptions according to 
which virtual participation is qualitatively different, as it opens up a gate for participation 
(for youth in particular) that no other form can replace (polat, 2005; stanley–WeaRe 
2004, 506, Baek–WoJcieszak–delli–caRpini 2010). Virtual participation, according to 
this approach, is an option that is able to involve groups that have never mobilised before.
There have been several attempts at a more detailed study of online participation in Hun-
gary. According to earlier studies of youth online political activity, groups are able to take 
advantage of the political potential of the web that are already committed and active. The 
study found that the information stratification of Hungarian society follows patterns of 
traditional demographic stratification. Social groups traditionally seen as privileged ap-
parently completely overlap with the web elite (see HáRi 2010, 104, szaBó–oRoss 2012, 
oRoss–szaBó 2014). At the same time, the 2015 survey of Active Youth made possible a 
more detailed analysis of this form of participation than ever before.
The essence of the questions and problems posed here can be summarized in whether on-
line participation actually means a new type of participation. Do different, formerly not 
mobilised groups truly appear through this form of political participation?
We listed six forms of online participation in the survey (one more than two years before). 
The respondent had to say whether he/she had participated in one or another form of par-
ticipation before. All six forms were pronouncedly described to make it clear they were 
not just about posting or “liking” in general, but that the respondent should associate the 
form specifically with social problems: 
· blogged: “blogged in connection with public issues/social topics”;
· posted: “posted topics connected to public issues/social problems”; 
· commented: “commented on blogs/social media in connection with public 
issues/social topics”;
· voted: “voted on the net on a question relating to public issues/society”;
· shared: “shared events, images, videos, posts reflecting your opinion concerning 
public issues/social problems on social media”; 
· liked: “liked posts on blogs or social media relating to public issues/social problems”. 
Based on the 2015 data, the form most frequently reported was the action of “liking” 
something, with 47 per cent, while 32 per cent of respondents replied “yes” to the ques-
tion of “voted on the net on a question relating to public issues/ society”, 24 per cent of 
respondents commented on a public issue topic, and 23 per cent posted text with content 
relating to public issues. 
Blogged 4
Posted 23
Commented 24
Liked 47
Voted 32
Shared 32
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Collective, 
offline (based 
on five forms of 
participation)
Online (based 
on five forms of 
participation)
Difference 
compared to 
offline
Agrees with?
System loyal 57 a 62 a +5
System indifferent 54 56 +2
System critical 69 73 +4
Acceptance of political values
Liberal, free thinking 58 61 +3
European, Western 64 68 +4
Christian Democrat, religious 65 61 -4
Conservative, traditionalist 43 64 +21*
Left-wing 50 81 +31***
Strong national sentiments 61 70 +19***
Believes in order and stability 58 58 0
Green, environmentalist 58 60 +2
Note:
Green color: The Pearson-Chi-Square probe showed significant correlation within the given variable.
Italics: higher than average participation. 
*: the change causes below average or average online activity.
**: the change causes online activity somewhat above the average.
***: the change causes online activity significantly above average.
Source: Active Youth in Hungary Research Group, 2015 (own calculations).
Certain categories in the above table seem to indicate that there are university/college 
subgroups who even though they operate under strong constraints nevertheless show a 
higher likelihood of speaking out online than of getting involved in the direct democratic 
field. We can see that compared to average online participation and also compared to 
offline participation, online participation is stronger among: 
· men
· students studying liberal arts
· law students
· agriculture students
· leftist students
· students with strong national sentiments.
Table 20. 
The comparison of collective offline and online activity. (percentages)
Collective, 
offline (based 
on five forms of 
participation)
Online (based 
on five forms of 
participation)
Difference 
compared to 
offline
At least one form 59 62 +3
Gender
Male 59 67 a +8**
Female 59 59 0
Educational attainment of parent
Neither parent has a diploma 63a 61 -2
At least one parent has a diploma 56 64 +8**
Type of permanent residence
Budapest 58 60 +2
City with county rights 58 61 +3
Other city 62 65 +3
Village 58 64 +6**
Maintainer of the institution
State university 62 a 62 0
State college 54 65 +9**
Foundation-run/private institution 34 58 +24*
Church institution 48 61 +13*
Educational level
Bachelor 57 62 +5
Master 64 58 -6*
Undivided 65 67 +2
Field of training
Agricultural 59 81 +22***
Agrarian 59 67 +8**
Liberal arts 59 58 -1
Economics 47 57 +10*
IT 71 77 +6***
Law 51 60 +9*
Engineering 66 66 0
Medicine 63 65 +2
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Table 21. 
 The binary logistic regression model of online protest.
 B Sig. Exp(B)
Is publicly organised (dummy) .684 .001 1.981
Interested in politics .292 .002 1.339
Does not know -1.512 .007 .220
Does not answer -1.089 .064 .337
Will certainly refrain from voting -1.122 .065 .325
System critical .502 .067 1.652
Accepts the label of order -1.045 .075 .352
Christian-democratic, conservative, religious -1.057 .087 .347
Source: Active Youth in Hungary Research Group, 2015 ( own calculations).
Just as we did in the case of collective participation, we examined the relation of online 
protesters to the system. The two data sets show the same mechanisms: System indiffer-
ents are the most passive, while system criticals stand out with respect to online protest 
activity. Our assumption according to which system critical activity is coupled with activ-
ity while system indifference is paired with passivity seems to be justified in this case as 
well. In turn, system loyals are situated somewhere in between the two. In certain places 
and times they have a voice, but this is far from what we experience among those who hold 
dictatorship to be acceptable under certain circumstances. 
Table 22. 
Online protest and the relationship towards the system. (percentages)
 
System 
loyal
System 
indifferent
System 
critical Total 
Online protest
Online passive 38 43 27 37
Protests’ online 62 57 73 63
Total  100 100 100 100
Pearson Chi-Square:11.685;. Sig:0.003; Phi/Cramer’s V: 0,122.
Source: Active Youth in Hungary Research Group, 2015 (own calculations).
The rest of the seemingly significant differences do not comply with several conditions. 
Generally we are speaking of groups who produce lower levels of participation compared 
to the average online or offline participation and even so, the growth still does not reach a 
level that is significantly above average. To better illustrate this: The 10 % higher online 
activity of IT students is all in vain if it does not even come close to average online activity. 
Similarly, online participation of students attending foundation-funded and/or private in-
stitutions increases by 24 % but at the same time is still below the level of average online 
participation. 
Overall, it seems as if we could record statistically relevant changes in the case of a few 
smaller groups; however, the problem of the number of items may arise (precisely because 
the groups are so small) and therefore even in these cases, the results should be treated 
with caution. Moreover, for example among liberal arts students, but especially in the 
case of lawyers, we can speak of an already- active layer of students for whom the online 
space could mean not so much an increase of democratism as an extension of collective 
participation into new fields. 
We examined the last question connected with online participation (i.e., to what can we 
attribute students’ intention to participate online) through a binary regression model. Our 
dependant variable is online participation, while the set of independent variables fully 
covers the group of questions used in the case of collective action. We are, therefore, 
speaking of a very wide set of variables that includes (aside from socio-demographic 
and socio-cultural factors) ideological orientation and participation in public life as well. 
As the following table indicates, there is a significant overlap among the explanatory vari-
ables of collective participation and online participation. In this case as well, organization 
increases the likelihood of online participation the most, while political interest effects 
online participation in the same way (to almost the same extent) as we have seen in the 
case of collective action. Strictly keeping to the P≤0.05 level of significance, one more 
variable has a meaningful effect, namely, if the student belongs to the camp of undecided 
voters (does not know which party he/she would vote for if parliamentary elections were 
held now), but this factor has a negative effect.43 At the same time it is worth mentioning 
three ideological factors whose effects are not significant but that nevertheless clearly 
have an effect on online participation in one direction or another. If someone is critical 
of the democratic system, then the likelihood of them having virtual participation is more 
than one and a half times greater than if they were not critical. In the case of those favour-
ing order and Christian Democrat/religious students (among whom there are many Fidesz 
voters) the likelihood of participation significantly decreases.
43. Nagelkerke R Square: 0.181; -2 Log likelihood: 815.567; Cox & Snell R Square: 0.132.
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Table 23. 
Comparison of offline collective and online activity. (percentages)
percentages
No participation 7
Only online participation 4
Only offline participation 30
Offline and online participation 59
Total 100
Source: Active Youth in Hungary Research Group, 2015 (own calculations).
Within the sphere of students studied by us, in 2015, seven percent of those polled did 
not participate in any of the 20 listed forms of participation and therefore did not make 
even the slightest effort to become involved. There is a clear correlation between interest 
in social, public and political issues and participation: The lower the level of interest for 
a given student, the higher the likelihood that he/she will stay out of any form of partici-
pation. Ten per cent of those who are not at all interested in social or public issues did not 
participate in anything, while this proportion was 12 per cent among those who were not 
interested in politics. 
Of the ideological orientations, concerning the left/right ranking, the proportion of passive 
students among right-wing voters is significantly smaller than among those who identified 
as leftist. While 22 per cent of those who clearly identified as belonging to the left can be 
seen as passive, this is just 9 per cent among the ranks of the right. Beyond this, a signif-
icant correlation could be seen among those who identified as moderate or radical, how-
ever, the proportion of passives was almost equal (6 and 5 per cent). No correlation can 
be detected among green identity and the proportion of passives. Based on the received 
results, no significant difference could be seen in the case of gender among indifferents. 
Chapter conclusion
Concerning the period between 2011 and 2015, the proportion of those preferring democ-
racy grew somewhat within the sphere of Hungarian university and college students, while 
the number of those who could accept an authoritarian political regime decreased. By 
contrast, a group of respondents who are pronouncedly sceptical and indifferent concern-
ing all political systems seems to be becoming a permanent fixture. During the analysis of 
the qualitative data collected during the course of the study we could identify five groups 
of interpretations. Members of the legal approach (18 %) approached democracy from 
the rule of law aspect, primarily emphasizing the importance of equality before the law in 
theory and practice, as well as the importance of all votes being equal. 
All in all, the important result of the study is that it became apparent that without a gen-
eral openness toward society and politics, as well as social integration, the development of 
any sort of participation within the sphere of Hungarian university and college students is 
very difficult. The shrinking voice of protest compared to 2013 among Hungarian univer-
sity students, however, seems to show a more anti-government (oppositional) character. 
Political indifferents
The results of large-scale Hungarian empirical studies show low levels of political in-
terest among youth, as well as low levels of trust in political institutions (gazsó–szaBó, 
2002; gazsó–laki, 2004; BaueR–szaBó, 2005; keRn–szaBó, 2011, oRoss 2013). It has 
also been confirmed among Hungarian students that forms of political participation are 
changing (oRoss–szaBó, 2014) and the proportion of forms of direct participation is es-
pecially high among students. In our earlier study (szaBó, 2013:64–65) we summed up 
the most important results within the frameworks of a model that included the questions, 
problems and topics studied within this volume. We identified the group of students that 
are indifferent to politics in that model and found that this group made up the largest 
group of students (42 %). This group did not have a single, well-defined, characteristic 
trait, but was characterized by several less-pronounced properties. Of these, the most 
important was the system sceptical attitude (that is, those unconcerned about which sys-
tem they live in) as well as those who could not decide whether they would vote if a 
parliamentary election were held at that time. These studies, however, drew conclusions 
concerning political passivity from the propensity to participate in elections. While in our 
earlier studies we followed this method (kálóczi, 2014) concerning students enrolled in 
Hungarian higher education, in our current study we break with this tradition in order to 
re-evaluate the earlier data, conclusions and ideas.  
In order to interpret political participation along the widest possible political spectrum, 
we studied 20 forms of participation in 2015, taking into consideration the survey con-
ducted by an international study (RotHenBüHleR–eHRleR–kissau, 2012). Based on the 
2015 data, in our current analysis we formulated statements about those students who 
are completely passive by collectively analysing all replies to questions dealing with par-
ticipation. We perceive those who are politically indifferent as passive actors for whom 
the political system does not hold any value; they are not committed, they do not show 
interest in politics, and they do not vote. In the following subsection we try to find out who 
the students are that are characterised by complete political passivity. 
Starting from the 2015 data, besides the previously mentioned 20 extended offline and 
online forms of participation, the proportions shown in Table 23 can be seen concerning 
political participation. 
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Between 2013 and 2015, the offline activity of Hungarian university and colleges stu-
dents concerning public issues stagnated and even decreased slightly. This is especially 
true for multiple participations (three or more). At the same time, while the end of 2012 
and the beginning of 2013 was a special period of student movements (protests against 
the planned change of the law concerning higher education) the year 2014/2015 was less 
strong in this sense, especially in light of the fact that in 2014 three major, national elec-
tions were held in Hungary. This – in line with Hungarian traditions – highly constricted 
the potential for protest.
Following the concepts of Hirschman, we covered separately in our study those protesters 
who had so-called repertoires for collective action. Our study found that involvement in 
separate forms of collective action is independent of gender or type of permanent address. 
Socio-cultural background and financial circumstances did not have significant relevance 
either. The extent of protest among students attending institutions maintained by different 
organizations is different, however. More than two-tenths of students of - financed big 
universities protest (62 %) while only one-third of students attending private colleges 
and universities do (34 %). The data indicate that those students protest who are open to 
social problems and issues and are interested in the events taking place outside of their 
lifeworld.
Based on the results of the study, we can ascertain that online participation actually 
makes it possible to involve new groups, as there are university and college subgroups 
which, though with strong constraints, nevertheless show higher likelihoods of speaking 
out online than getting involved in the direct democratic field. We can see that com-
pared to average online participation and also compared to offline participation, online 
participation is stronger according to gender (among men); according to field of study 
(among students studying liberal arts, law and agriculture); and from the perspective of 
ideological orientation (among leftist students and those with strong national sentiments). 
Our study found that basically the same factors influence online and offline collective 
participation, namely, a general openness toward both politics and society. Also, without 
social integration, the development of any form of participation is very difficult within the 
sphere of university and college students.
Within the sphere of students studied by us in 2015, seven per cent of those polled did not 
participate in any of the 20 listed forms of participation, which means they did not make 
even the slightest effort to become involved. 
According to the interpretation of the majoritarian approach (28 %), democracy is 
the realization of the people’s will and when the will of the majority prevails. Members 
of the leadership approach (20 %) define democracy through the leader-led dichotomy, in 
other words, the principle of representation. According to this interpretation, the role of 
the voter is to elect representatives who will have to take into consideration voter opinions 
during the course of directing the political system. Members of the opinion-based approach 
(21 %) stress the deliberative nature of democracy.
According to their definition, the meaning of democracy is the ability to voice opinions 
and have opinions taken into account in equal measure in the political decision-making 
process. Finally, the liberty-based approach (18 %) looks at the content of democracy 
from the perspective of the individual. For them, democracy is primarily about the per-
sonal liberties of individuals and the freedom to shape individual destinies. At the same 
time, they acknowledge its limitations as well, which primarily means adherence to the 
rights and obligations pertaining to individuals. It is important to note concerning the 
received responses that close to a third (29 %) of those students who were interviewed for 
the series were not capable of giving a reply that could be analysed contentwise or simply 
refused to provide an answer. That is, a significant part of those asked could not comment 
on the issue in a meaningful way, which is a good indicator of the existing democratic 
deficit within Hungarian society. Besides defining the content of democracy, the levels 
of identification with democracy also provided interesting results. Those students belong 
most to the group of those preferring democracy who identified as rather left-wing, mod-
erate, and liberal, as well as those who characterized themselves through mainly liberal, 
free-thinking, Western/European political ideas.
The financial dimension of satisfaction with democracy was defined to the greatest extent 
by the financial circumstances of the students and their views concerning the future. Those 
university or college students are the most dissatisfied who live among the worst financial 
circumstances and who see their future as the most uncertain. It is also important to 
stress that those students who are better off financially and have a more certain view of 
their future are more satisfied with the performance of the Hungarian democratic order; 
nevertheless, even so, an overwhelming majority of them belong to the group of those that 
are dissatisfied. At the same time, the political dimension of satisfaction is not relevant. 
There is no significant difference between those groups of students who relate differently 
to the democratic system in this sense, which means that they are dissatisfied with the 
workings of Hungarian democracy to a very similar extent. 
The public activity of Hungarian university and college students are somewhat higher 
than the earlier large-sample youth studies indicated (szaBó–oRoss 2014). This activity, 
however, is very limited with respect to political organization; it is aimed much more 
at leisure activities. In 2015, as was the case two years ago, sports clubs were the key 
element of youth organizational networks. The second most popular form of organization 
is professional, scientific organizations, followed by cultural groups, organizations for 
the preservation of heritage, artistic groups, church groups and religious communities. 
Compared to 2013, the rate of involvement in environmentalist groups grew, and the pro-
portion of those connected to local student bodies (HÖK) surpassed 10 per cent. All other 
organizations (all in all we listed 12 types of organizational forms) were less relevant.
Political loyalty
Introduction
In this chapter we look at how Hirschman’s theory of exit/voice/loyalty is reflected in the 
political preferences of students. What sentiments and attitudes can be deducted from 
the choices of the generation? According to the terminology outlined in the introduction, 
those who are able to chose a party are considered loyal,44 however, based on earlier 
studies, we can presume that voting for opposition (left-wing) and anti-elite (Jobbik and 
LMP) parties may be one forms of protest. The question is what the differences are be-
tween these opposition students who from one perspective are loyal but from another can 
be considered as belonging to the category of voice. What are the characteristics of those 
students who remained loyal to the governing party? What can we say about the students 
who are indifferent (in the sense of Hirschman), those who are dissatisfied with both the 
government and all the other parties, and whose passivity is also expressed by the fact that 
they cannot name a favourite party? What determines whether a young university student 
acquires a constructive or destructive attitude in the first years of being able to vote and 
which party he/she starts to orient toward? 
In the 2011–2012 and 2013 Active Youth study (szaBó 2012 and szaBó 2014) the party 
preferences of university and college students showed a very balanced picture: There was 
only a few percentage points’ difference between Jobbik,45 Fidesz46 and LMP47 (as well 
as Együtt and PM48 in the 2013 study). A majority of students chose from amongst those 
parties. The support for the left was significantly below that for the two right-wing parties 
in both earlier waves of the study, though there was significant support in 2011 and in 
2013 for LMP and Együtt-PM respectively. By 2015, the situation had changed substan-
tially: LMP can no longer be seen as a part of the left; those who consider themselves left-
wing (MSZP,49 DK,50 Együtt – PM) altogether only have eight percent of student support, 
while Fidesz has 12 per cent, LMP 14 per cent and Jobbik 20 per cent of popularity. 
44. Political loyalty in its classical sense – repeated election of a party several times in a row – could only be measured with a panel 
study. Here, in line with the introduction, we consider party voters loyal as well.
45. Jobbik: Movement for a Better Hungary, commonly known as Jobbik, is a Hungarian radical nationalist, far-right political party 
enjoying large (10-20 %) voter support. As of this writing it holds 24 seats in the Parliament. The party has been criticized for its 
anti-Roma rhetoric and its support of the illegal Hungarian Guard.
46. Fidesz–Hungarian Civic Union is the governing conservative party that held an absolute two-thirds majority in Parliament from 
2010 until 2014. Currently it is the biggest Hungarian party, with 114 MPs in Parliament.
47. LMP [Politics Can Be Different] is a green Hungarian political party. Founded in 2009, it was one of four parties to win seats in 
the National Assembly in the 2010 parliamentary election; currently it has five5 MPs in Parliament.
48. Együtt 2014 [Together 2014] is a completely new centrist liberal party that has three parliamentary representatives and was 
founded by a fairly popular former Prime Minister, Gordon Bajnai. The PM Party (Párbeszéd Magyarországért - Dialogue for 
Hungary) was formerly a branch of the LMP (a green party), which split over whether to ally with the Socialists and Együtt 2014 in 
an electoral battle against Fidesz. As of this writing PM holds one parliamentary seat in Parliament.
49. The Hungarian Socialist Party (Hungarian: Magyar Szocialista Párt, MSZP) is a social democratic political party in Hungary. 
MSZP lost the 2010 elections (won by Fidesz with a 2/3 majority). As of this writing it has 29 seats in Parliament. Currently they 
are the biggest opposition party in Hungary. However, MSZP has low support among young people. This finding has held true since 
the regime change, and over time the disproportionate age composition of the party has become an increasingly serious problem for 
it. Only 15 % of MSZP voters are under 30 years old, 43 % are over 60 years old, and the average age of the membership is 55.9 
years (BíRó-nagy 2012, 203).
50. The Democratic Coalition (Hungarian: Demokratikus Koalíció), abbreviated to DK, is a center-left political party in Hungary led 
by former Prime Minister Ferenc Gyurcsány. Founded in 2010 as a group within the Hungarian Socialist Party (MSZP), the party split 
from the MSZP on 22 October 2011 and became a separate party. It has five MPs in the National Assembly.
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Table 24. 
Support for parties based on gender, age, permanent residence,  
religion and financial situation. (percentages)
Left Fidesz Jobbik LMP Undecided
Gender
Male 7 12 23 13 45
Female 9 12 17 16 46
Age
Above 21 8 11 17 17 48
18–21 8 14 25 12 41
Permanent 
residence
Budapest 13 11 9 16 51
City with county rights 6 13 19 18 44
Other city 8 12 25 10 46
Village 7 12 28 14 39
Religion
I am religious,  
I follow the teachings 
of the church
1 37 21 9 31
I am religious in my 
own way
7 10 21 15 46
I cannot tell whether  
I am religious or not
6 15 15 14 50
I am not religious 10 8 18 16 49
I am an atheist 19 5 22 17 36
Financial 
situation
I do not have financial 
worries
10 16 19 16 40
I make ends meet  
by budgeting well
7 12 18 14 49
I can just make ends 
meet
11 11 24 15 40
Total 8 12 20 15 45
Note: in the category of financial situation, the number of items for the options of “I have financial 
problems from month to month” and “I live in deprivation” were too low to analyse.
Source: Active Youth in Hungary Research Group, 2015 (own calculations).
As among the total population, and also in the earlier student samples (Félix–gRegoR 
2014), Jobbik continues to be overrepresented among men, while LMP and the left-wing 
parties performed above average among women. The age group breakdown also resembles 
the previous results: Once again, Jobbik gained outstanding support among those 22 and 
younger. It is therefore worth re-examining the formerly- confirmed hypothesis according 
to which the radical party can have a strong attraction for teenagers with more free time 
and fewer obligations, primarily through far-right subculture and its strong symbolism 
(Róna–söRés 2012). 
What did not change is the proportion of undecided voters: Even in the latest wave of 
research, somewhat more than 40 per cent could not or did not want to choose a party. 
Besides the questions posed in the introduction, we try to explore the reasons for the power 
shift through statistical analysis of the different parties and uncertain voters. In the first 
part of the chapter, we discuss the socio-demographic variables (age, gender, university 
programme, financial situation, etc.) and continue the analysis with data concerning the 
social life, value preferences and ideology of students, then look at the questions directly 
related to parties. In the final part of the empirical analysis, the bivariate correlations 
used up until then will be complemented by a multivariate analysis. We will also examine 
the aspects of green orientation and gender separately. 
Social background
During the course of the analysis we will look at the supporters of left-wing parties collec-
tively. The reason for this is that the item numbers of MSZP, DK, Együtt and PM are too 
low to examine on their own. The joint candidacy of the four parties in the 2014 elections 
and their politics since then does not justify considering them as individual blocs. Besides 
presenting the students sympathising with the left-wing, Fidesz, Jobbik and LMP – as in 
2013 (kalóczi 2014) – we look at undecided students separately, many of whom reject all 
parties as a show of protest. The complete sample consists of 800 students, of whom 65 
(8.1 per cent) are left-wing voters, 98 (12 per cent) belong to the camp of Fidesz, support-
ers of LMP number 116 (14.5 per cent), those of Jobbik number 159 (20 per cent), and 
uncertain voters number 362 (45 per cent). Item numbers are only shown if appropriate; 
most of the data cover percentages. We also took care to only list demographic or value 
groups with significant item numbers; therefore, the margin of error remains below 6 – 7 
%. First we looked at demographic variables, which showed significant effect on the party 
choice of students in our previous studies as well. 
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We can find several developments concerning the breakdown of the educational attain-
ment of parents compared to the 2013 tendencies. The left-wing camp is more concentrat-
ed than ever among the children of parents with higher educational attainment (BíRó nagy 
2014), while there is only a slight difference here among the groups for LMP and Fidesz. 
Jobbik, however, outdid everyone once again among the group of first-generation college 
students (from families with elementary or vocational education - for two years earlier 
see: Róna–ReicH 2014). The radical party is almost three times as popular among those 
students where the highest educational attainment of both parents is maximum a voca-
tional education than it is among those where both the mother and father have a diploma. 
Table 26. 
Party support according to fields of study. (percentages)
Item numbers 
of the field in 
the sample
Left Fidesz Jobbik LMP Undecided
Agrarian 37 3 16 19 16 46
Liberal arts 78 5 18 22 18 37
Health sciences 
(not doctor) 36 6 3 31 14 47
Economics 144 11 10 17 14 49
IT 50 8 4 26 12 50
Law 34 15 12 15 12 47
Engineer 157 6 10 26 13 45
Arts 26 4 8 12 12 65
Medical 65 14 22 22 11 32
Pedagogical 46 7 9 24 9 52
Social sciences 41 10 12 7 24 46
Natural sciences 57 9 18 11 23 40
Total 8 13 20 14 45
Source: Active Youth in Hungary Research Group, 2015 (own calculations).
We did not find strong correlations concerning education level (BA, MA, and PhD), or 
form of financing and funding of the institution (church, state, private)51, but there are 
significant differences among the patterns of party popularity according to courses. We 
have to be cautious concerning numbers in the case of programmes with fewer numbers 
of students, however. 
51. Except for the overrepresentation of Fidesz among the students enrolled in church-funded institutions; however, this is not 
surprising given their levels of support among religious students.
Though less spectacular than the support for Jobbik, the support for Fidesz among the 
youngest age group is nevertheless considerably higher, while voters 22 and older tend to 
support LMP. There is no dramatic change according to place of residence either; left-wing 
parties only have considerable support among students living in the capital, while Jobbik is 
more popular in the rural areas. Religion shows the most robust effect of all demographic 
variables on Fidesz: The party is very strong among churchgoer/religious students but very 
weak among those who are not religious. The left-wing parties and LMP show a more 
moderate reflection of this, while in the case of Jobbik we did not find a strong correlation. 
According to the breakdown by financial circumstances, however, it is the support for 
LMP and the left that shows a balanced tendency, while Jobbik is somewhat more popular 
among the circle of poorer students and Fidesz among better-off students.
Except for Fidesz, the above results show similar tendencies to the samples representative 
of the total population. According to nationwide studies, the majority of the governing 
party’s supporters come from small towns, are middle-aged, are members of the middle 
class or are less well-off, and are religious. Only the latter could be seen among the group 
of university and college students. 
Table 25. 
Support for parties according to parental educational attainment. (percentages)
Left Fidesz Jobbik LMP Undecided
Father’s 
educational 
attainment
Vocational or 
elementary
5 10 26 12 47
Secondary leaving 
certificate
7 15 22 16 40
Diploma 11 14 13 16 46
Educational 
attainment 
of parents 
combined
Both parents have 
maximum vocational 
training
4 10 27 13 46
One vocational, other 
secondary
8 13 19 17 44
Both secondary or 
one vocational, other 
diploma
7 10 23 13 48
One diploma, other 
secondary
13 17 25 13 33
Both parents have 
diploma
11 15 11 17 47
Total 8 13 20 14 45
Source: Active Youth in Hungary Research Group, 2015 (own calculations).
76.  -  Exit, Voice, Loyalty and Neglect Political loyalty  -  77.
Social activity and media consumption
In this part we examine what sort of social-public activity the young supporters of parties 
show, their knowledge of foreign languages, and from which media channels they receive 
their information. These variables are less frequent in sociological analyses. 
Table 27. 
Command of language, organizational connection, and online/ offline activity within the 
camps of the separate parties. (average points)
Left Fidesz Jobbik LMP Undecided Complete sample
Command of language 4.40 4.02 3.43 4.28 4.00 3.96
Organizational connection 1.49 1.58 1.18 1.33 1.17 1.27
Offline activity 3.42 3.04 3.22 2.93 2.52 2.85
Online activity 1.91 1.60 1.77 2.08 1.34 1.61
Note: In the case of each language we gave the following points: 0=does not speak, 1=basic, 
2=intermediate, 4=advanced. This is a summary of the five languages we asked about.
Organizational connection: We asked about connection to 12 types of organizations.  
Those respondents received a maximum of 12 points who were members of all 12.  
On average, students are members of slightly more than one orzanisation.  
See the descriptions of the specific types in the survey. 
Offline and online activity: We gave 14 offline and 6 online activities. The averaged points show 
on average how many activities the voters of each party participate in. See the descriptions of the 
specific types in the survey.
Source: Active Youth in Hungary Research Group, 2015 (own calculations).
Concerning language skills, there is only one significant difference: Jobbik voters self-re-
port knowing fewer languages or speaking the languages they do know at a lower level 
than others. It seems realistic that the less-privileged situations and family backgrounds 
of Jobbik supporters might be behind this, but it is more likely that the difference is due 
to its supporters’ low average age. In the multivariate analysis the language variable was 
no longer significant once we controlled for age. Radical students were somewhat behind 
in number of connections to social organizations, especially compared to Fidesz and left 
voters. In our earlier study we identified that a more isolated social position (which could 
also be linked to their overrepresentation among teenagers) was one of the drivers leading 
to orientation towards Jobbik (Róna–söRés 2012). At the same time, Jobbik supporters 
showed above-average rates of online (commenting, sharing on Facebook, etc.) and offline 
(demonstrations, petititons, etc.) public-political activity, which is not surprising knowing 
the virulent web and grassroots background of the party. 
It can be said that the left has above-average support here compared to the support it 
receives among the students of those five-year undivided courses that are exempt from the 
Bachelor-Master division (law and medicine), while Fidesz receives support among med-
ical students, liberal arts students, and those studying natural sciences, Jobbik receives 
support among students participating in IT and technical training, and LMP receives sup-
port among social science students and those studying natural sciences. These correlations 
do not necessarily arise from the nature of the course or the mentality of the education 
for the given course: The overrepresentation of men within Jobbik is reflected in the fact 
that technical and IT students (in typically male dominated fields) support the party to 
a great extent. In the case of LMP, which builds on green, alternative, anti-globalisation 
movements (see Critical Mass generation by szaBó 2011, 2014) it is somewhat evident 
that students studying natural and social sciences sympathise with them, as there are lots 
of young people within the subculture with similar interests. Among the party elite there 
are several sociologists, economists, biologists, and experts dealing with environmental 
science (this was especially true before the party split). Perhaps it is no accident either 
that the students of the traditionally most “conservative” courses (law and medicine) 
orient in an above-average way towards the older parties (Fidesz and the left).
All in all, the socio-demographic character of Fidesz’s voters remained constant com-
pared to the previous survey (kmetty 2014). MSZP and DK sympathizers two years ago 
who were more rural and not so well-off were complemented by the priviliged voter base 
of Együtt-PM – nevertheless, the left-wing camp became much smaller than it was in 
2013 (BíRó-nagy 2014). It seems as  LMP could diversify its voter base compared to our 
previous studies through its growth (keil 2012), and it also seems in the case of Jobbik 
that their catch-all, “people’s party” strategy has resulted in a similar tendency. Sup-
port for Jobbik increased somewhat among the groups of students studying in Western 
Hungarian universities, among women, among the religious, and among wealthier, older 
students as well, although it did not lose its original character. 
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Table 29. 
Frequency of media consumption among party supporters average points, scale of 3 
(1=regularly; 2=occasionally; 3=never)
Left Fidesz Jobbik LMP Undecided Complete sample
Index.hu 1.58 1.96 1.93 1.72 1.86 1.84
Origo.hu 1.94 2.2 2.16 2.24 2.16 2.16
444.hu 2.12 2.53 2.45 2.14 2.4 2.37
Kuruc.info 2.85 2.87 2.47 2.85 2.84 2.77
Facebook 1.71 1.57 1.64 1.66 1.62 1.63
Commercial TV 2.03 2.05 2.03 2.29 2.24 2.17
Public TV 2.63 2.1 2.34 2.56 2.5 2.44
Public radio 2.6 2.33 2.53 2.53 2.61 2.55
Commercial radio 2.38 2.17 2.31 2.53 2.42 2.38
Dailies 2.52 2.45 2.56 2.53 2.63 2.57
Source: Active Youth in Hungary Research Group, 2015 (own calculations).
One of the most important conclusions that can be drawn from Table 29 is the extent to 
which Facebook dominates the habits of political orientation among university and col-
lege students: 52 per cent collect political information regularly through Facebook,, 34 
per cent occasionally do so, while only 14 per cent said they never do so. This is how we 
arrived at the 1.63 average, which shows that Facebook is more influential than any other 
media channel, including the most-read online portal, Index. In a 2013 Ipsos52 youth 
study, even TV and web portals were somewhat ahead of the already popular Facebook 
as sources for political information. This means either the social media site has advanced 
over the past two years, or its use is more frequent among university and college students, 
or both. This phenomenon already explains many reasons for Jobbik’s high support, which 
receives the most “likes” among university and college students on Facebook out of all 
the parties and youth organizations. We can also clearly see the dominance of Internet 
sources compared to television, and especially to radio and daily newspapers.
The prevalence and limits of party-based media consumption can be seen from the table 
as well. Left-wing supporters read 444 more, Jobbik supporters read kuruc.info, while 
Fidesz supporters are the most frequent consumers of public media. We can also see that 
novoting bloc informs itself one-sidedly: Both Index and Origo are more popular sources 
for all three political parties than the previously mentioned “party” media are. 
52. http://ipsos.hu/hu/news/leginkabb-a-tevebol-tajekozodnak-a-fiatalok.
The increased activity of the left could be due to a decrease in members, presuming that 
the most faithful members have stood by them. An interesting characteristic of LMP sym-
pathisers is that they are the most active on the net, while in “real” (offline) participation 
they are the least active. There are no significant differences here between the parties , 
but there was 2–3 tenths of a difference between the average points on scales of 12, 14, 
and 6. The indifferents (neglect) – the group made up of uncertains – were, as a matter of 
course, significantly lower. We can see significant differences in several cases; on a scale 
of five, Fidesz was 4–5 tenths higher than the full sample average.
Table 28. 
Presumed career perspective among party supporters (average points)  
(View of the future: 1=not at all certain; 5=very certain; possibility for employment: 
1=very unfavourable, 5=very favourable)
Left Fidesz Jobbik LMP Undecided Complete sample
How certain do you see your 
future, how secure do you feel 
concerning your future?
3.43 3.81 3.49 3.36 3.42 3.47
According to your experiences 
how are the possibilities for 
employment in and around where 
you live with the degree and 
qualification that you will have?
3.05 3.58 3.01 3.07 3.13 3.15
Source: Active Youth in Hungary Research Group, 2015 (own calculations).
Similar to the 2013 study, once again, Fidesz voters saw their career perspectives much 
more favourably and are more confident concerning their futures. We continue to see two 
plausible reasons for this: It is possible that pro-government youth “see the world through 
rose-coloured glasses” (based upon their sources of information), but it also seems real-
istic that they turn to Fidesz because they are satisfied. The values of the supporters of 
the other parties are almost exactly the same: They all see their possibilities as mediocre. 
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This is not neccessarily a party-political manifestation; nevertheless it makes the hypoth-
esis probable that some students who became disillusioned with the left – and especially 
with Együtt-PM – turned to LMP. In other words, left-wing students are relatively divided 
among LMP and left-wing parties. The green party took many of them away from MSZP, 
DK, Együtt and PM. 
Table 31. 
Distribution of the liberal–conservative scale among party supporters. (percentages)
Left Fidesz Jobbik LMP Undecided Complete sample
1 – liberal 12 – 3 14 4 6
2 31 11 10 25 15 16
3 12 9 10 25 16 15
4 29 36 39 25 49 40
5 9 20 18 10 10 13
6 6 18 11 1 5 7
7– conservative – 6 8 – 2 3
100 100 100 100 100 100
Source: Active Youth in Hungary Research Group, 2015 (own calculations).
The next table is also interesting primarily because of the new parties. Most left-wing 
youth are liberal and most pro-government students are conservative (though the rate of 
those who mentioned the mean among them was also high). Given the origins of Fidesz, 
this may seem strange, but it is not to those who have followed their anti-liberal rhetoric 
over the past decades. It goes completely against the self-image of Jobbik, however, that 
among its student supporters only 37 per cent consider themselves conservative, 39 per 
cent place themselves in the middle, while 23 per cent position themselves on the liberal 
side! We called attention to this inconsistency already in 2012; at that time our expla-
nation was that young people’s views are not yet mature and many are unaware of what 
these indicators mean. Voting for Jobbik is not done for ideological reasons therefore, but 
for habitual, organizational, or simply protest ones (Róna–söRés 2012). Most likely this 
has not changed, but according to a new interpretation it could also show Jobbik moving 
in the direction of a people’s party. In the case of LMP, once again, the data demonstrate 
that the left-wing/liberal element is much stronger among the party’s voter base than the 
conservative/right-wing one is (at least on the university level). 
The Jobbik camp’s dilution might be behind the fact that the highly hostile to Jobbik 444.
hu and the explicitly Jobbik-friendly kuruc.info are almost equally frequently accessed by 
them. Aside from the infamous kuruc.info portal, left-wing students look at all sources on 
the net more than the average student does, which further strengthens the hypothesis that 
the most loyal supporters have stayed with the party. In the case of LMP, the situation is 
the other way around: Scores closer to the average characterize a wider, diverse audience 
for them. 
Choice of political values
In this sub-category we examine the relationship between party preference and choice of 
political values. First we look at self-placement along the left-right, liberal-conservative, 
and moderate-radical scale. 
Table 30. 
The distribution of the left–right scale among party supporters. (percentages)
Left Fidesz Jobbik LMP Undecided Complete sample
1 – left 9 1 1 3 2 2
2 25 2 1 14 2 6
3 31 5 5 17 9 11
4 25 23 24 49 62 45
5 8 35 30 14 16 20
6 3 27 26 3 7 12
7– right 7 13 1 2 4
100 100 100 100 100 100
Source: Active Youth in Hungary Research Group, 2015 (own calculations).
Concerning the left-right scale, there are no surprising tendencies in the case of left-wing 
and Fidesz supporters: The majority of the former placed themselves to the left, the latter 
to the right, and the extremities were rather unpopular amongst them as well. In effect, 
the division of Jobbik voters was to be expected also; perhaps here what is worth mention-
ing is that even in their case, choosing the extreme right value was not too frequent, and 
every fourth student voting for the radical party chose the mean. It follows from LMP’s 
self-definition that the mean value (4) was the most popular among those who prefer the 
green party, and at the same time they chose the left-wing value almost twice as much (34 
per cent) than the right-wing value (18 per cent). 
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Table 33. 
Party support based on political labels. (percentages)
Left Fidesz Jobbik LMP Undecided
A given 
label’s 
frequency 
in the 
sample
Liberal, freethinking 14 8 8 25 45 27
European/Western 12 10 10 17 52 15
Conservative, 
traditionalist 2 29 26 3 40 7
Strong national 
sentiments 2 9 52 5 33 9
Order and stability 2 9 31 10 48 16
Green, 
environmentalist 5 2 24 20 50 13
Religious, believer 2 32 17 13 36 7
Complete sample 8 12 20 15 44 100
Note: the question was the following: “The following political ideas can be characteristic of how 
people think. Choose the one that is closest to your mentality!”
The Christian Democrat, left-wing, radical and Social Democrat labels were only mentioned  
by 1-3 per cent of the respondents; therefore we did not include them in the Table
Source: Active Youth in Hungary Research Group, 2015 (own calculations)
The first thing we can learn from Table 33 is that there is a strong but far from determin-
istic correlation between identifying with political indicators and party choice. A majority 
of students were “consistent” in their two preferences, but a substantial number were 
absolutely not: Many would vote for a party that does not propagate – or is even hostile to 
– the ideological values they chose. It can be seen as the left-wing parties’ complete fail-
ure that only 12–14 per cent of liberal and Western-oriented students would vote for them 
(who comprise42 per cent of the sample). Even support for Fidesz and Jobbik is almost 
the same among this group; LMP, however is significantly more popular among them. 
As the term liberal does not appear at all in the self-identification of the green party, we 
see a significant amount of inconsistency here as well between the party elite’s choice 
and the masses’ choice. The complete sample data show also that university students are 
divided if they have to chose betwee these two terms: Despite Churchill’s famous saying, 
liberals are a minority compared to those who choose the mean value, but conservative 
values were chosen frequently as well. Naturally, uncertainty or aversion to labels can be 
behind this as well. 
Table 32. 
Distribution of the moderate–radical scale among party supporters. (percentages)
Left Fidesz Jobbik LMP Undecided Complete sample
1 – moderate 15 10 2 10 9 8
2 26 18 7 27 13 16
3 19 24 14 25 15 18
4 34 34 39 29 46 40
5 5 12 17 7 10 11
6 2 2 13 – 5 5
7– radical – – 8 3 1 3
100 100 100 100 100 100
Source: Active Youth in Hungary Research Group, 2015 (own calculation).
The moderate-radical scale is the only one that herds the left-wing, pro-government and 
LMP supporters all into one place. The supporters of Jobbik actually do not stand out 
that much from this grouping either: Even among their followers the mean (39 per cent) 
is somewhat more popular than the radical side (38 per cent) and 23 per cent consider 
themselves moderate. This also indicates a camp that is moving in the direction of a peo-
ple’s party. In any case, the idea that being young goes hand-in-hand with being radical 
has proved to be completely false: Only 19 per cent of respondents considered themselves 
radical. We can see clearly from tables 7, 8, and 9 that uncertain voters did not contradict 
themselves in these choices either: The popularity of the mean value (4) within their circle 
matches their indifferent, disinterested, averse mentality. In the following table, respond-
ents had to choose one label from the options listed.
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This could also be a form of voice in the sense of Hirschman. In our survey,similar to 
previous waves of research, we included statements measuring authoritarianism (based 
on the F-scale of Adorno), social responsibility, leader cult, pro-order and anti-’Gypsy’ 
sentiments. 
Table 35. 
Average points of agreement with political statements by party supporters - scale of 5 
(1=does not agree at all; 5=agrees completely)
Left Fidesz Jobbik LMP Undecided Complete sample
 “Children have to 
learn that obedience 
and respect for 
authority are most 
important.”
2.92 3.86 3.72 3.06 3.38 3.42
“People should take 
responsibility for 
themselves instead of 
the State.”
3.35 3.56 3.4 3.59 3.44 3.46
“The country needs 
strong leaders, 
not political 
programmes.”
2.58 3.06 3.55 2.82 3.01 3.06
“Most impoverished 
people are 
responsible 
for their own 
impoverishment.”
2.22 2.62 2.57 2.19 2.34 2.39
“Increased rigour is 
necessary for public 
order protection: Order 
is more important than 
criminals’ rights.”
3.31 3.71 3.92 3.37 3.54 3.59
“Men’s job is to 
make money; the 
wife should deal with 
the children and the 
household.”
1.77 2.45 2.3 1.78 2.08 2.1
“Propensity for 
crime is in the 
‘Gypsies’’ blood.”
2.65 2.83 3.55 2.07 2.60 2.74
100 100 100 100 100 100
Source: Active Youth in Hungary Research Group, 2015 (own calculations).
The relatively high number of uncertain students indicates the left-wing parties’ crisis as 
well: They should be as successful among this group as the right-wing parties are in the 
strong national sentiments, conservative or religious camps. What might cause Fidesz a 
headache, however, isthat most members of the quite large group who prefer order chose 
Jobbik, not the governing party. LMP can be disappointed because a larger portion of 
green-oriented youth chose the radical party than chose LMP. This is the success of Jobbik 
and its catch-all strategy. It is also easy to see how diverse the camps of Jobbik and LMP 
are: Aside from a few exceptions, they received votes from all groups. 
In the following section we asked respondents to express their relationship towards de-
mocracy and dictatorship. The supporters of all opposition parties were dissatisfied with 
the current workings of democracy; only pro-government voters spoke more favourably of 
it. This definitely underscores that, from a certain perspective (relationship towards the 
system) pro-government students can be considered loyal to the system while opposition 
voters belong to the category of voice (according to Hirschman). The data in Table 34 
show that choices between democracy and dictatorship are even more telling.
Table 34. 
Perception of the democratic political system and of dictatorship 
by party support (percentages)
Left Fidesz Jobbik LMP Undecided Total
System loyal 62 55 33 65 43 47
System indifferents 23 24 37 21 37 32
System critical 15 21 30 15 21 21
100 100 100 100 100 100
Source: Active Youth in Hungary Research Group, 2015 (own calculations).
Like our earlier studies, unconditional supporters of democracy are a relative but not ab-
solute majority this year as well (their proportion grew somewhat). Broken down by par-
ties, only Jobbik voters show a different picture: Proportions of pro-democracy students 
are much lower within their circle and are divided almost in equal proportions among the 
three options. We cannot provide a new answer for this compared to what we have given 
for the earlier waves of research: Jobbik has expressed its scepticism towards democracy 
repeatedly, thereby conditioning its voters to accept criticism and/or indifference toward 
it. We would like to stress, however (also based on our previous studies) that these an-
swers do not necessarily represent clear-cut preferences, but could represent emotions and 
disappointment. Many express their disappointment with the current system in this way 
without thinking about what the alternative of a dictatorship would mean. 
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The first thing that can be observed is how well the parties are known: We subtracted the 
frequency (first line) of the “I don’t know them” replies and those who had no association 
with the given party (second line) and this is how we arrived at the rate for those answers 
that could be evaluated (third line), which is an indicator of how well the parties are 
known among university and college students. (Naturally there is no perfect indicator for 
this.) We can see from the data that the four parties that have parliamentary fractions 
stand out in this case, as even LMP is known by three-quarters of the students. At the 
same time, the left-wing parties face a significant challenge; the names of former prime 
ministers’ parties are unknown by half of the students (DK and Együtt, Gyucsány’s and 
Bajnai’s parties). 
We can also learn from the associations that, for Együtt and PM, the main risk is not 
antipathy but that they are seen as “powerless”, “insignificant”, and therefore negligible. 
For DK and especially for MSZP the real problem is not that they were seen as “yester-
day’s news” and not credible in most students’ eyes, but that even their own voters did not 
seem enthusiastic about them. Only some of their voters could mention a truly positive as-
sociation in connection with them. This, if not to the same extent, is also an existing phe-
nomenon for Fidesz as well. It is not the negative comments that could be expected that 
pose a challenge for them, but the fact that many supporters gave positive answers from 
which it seems that even they are not really satisfied with the government but do not see a 
better alternative (“they want to do good”, “acceptable”). It also raises doubts concern-
ing the long term loyalty of LMP’s supporters that the most frequent positive mentions 
do not resonate with the party’s policies, but with the fact that it is not corrupt and did 
not form an alliance with either the left or the right. The party’s main advantage is that 
they have a clean record. This is another proof of voice. At the same time (and in the case 
of LMP as well), there is also the risk of becoming like Együtt and PM: Many think that 
they are not serious and do not stand a chance. With Jobbik, though, both the negative 
and the positive mentions show a form of success. The positive ones show enthusiasm and 
identification with the main messages of the party (“order” and “patriotism”), but what 
is new is the decrease in negative comments. In 2013, 41 per cent of respondents associ-
ated comments such as “racist”, “Nazi”, “fascist”, “aggressive”, and “extremist” with 
the radical party; by 2015, only 23 per cent associated Jobbik with such descriptors. We 
already had several indirect proofs of Jobbik’s catch-all strategy (“cuteness campaign”) 
and its success, but this is the best example of this phenomenon to date. Aside from pro-
test motivations, the motivations of political loyalty, or at least enthusiasm (which can 
indicate loyalty) were most prevalent for Jobbik. 
In the concluding part of our analysis we ran logistic regression models: This is a multivar-
iate statistical method that shows to what extent each separate explanatory variable af-
fects the dependent variable (having controlled for the interactions of the other variables). 
The dependent variable in the four models was voting for each of the four political forces, 
and all the variables used in the chapter were included as independent variables in the 
models. We only listed significant explanatory variables in the Table These are those which, 
when all other factors remain unchanged, have the greatest effect on party preferences.
We found few surprising elements in the average points among left-wing respondents. 
Similar to previous results, they rejected a strong leader and emphatically stood by wom-
en’s emancipation. Concerning anti-’Gypsy’ and pro-order sentiments, these were not alien 
to left-wing students, as it is logical as well that they view the impoverished as victims. The 
only thing that can be seen as uncommon is that they chose values close to the mean for the 
second statement, even though the left-wing ideology calls for an increased state role. It 
is striking that, aside from two statements, LMP supporters’ views hardly differ from left 
supporters’ views. The more empathetic approach toward Roma comes from the party’s 
message; however, the moderate level for personality cult rejection does not come from 
the party’s message, which shows the party’s diversity. The high conformity level is one of 
the many signs that among university students LMP has taken voters mainly from the left.
There is also a high level of similarity between the Fidesz and Jobbik averages: pro-order 
sentiments, the fact that they blame the impoverished to a greater extent for their impov-
erishment, and the fact that they would restrict women to a traditional role to a greater 
degree is characteristic for both parties. (Naturally, we interpret this divergence compared 
to the average, as most right-wing respondents reject statements blaming the poor and 
restricting women.) Jobbik supporters believe much more in the need for a strong leader 
and in the propensity for crime among Roma people than do pro-government supporters. 
Compared to previous results, the only change in their case is that they blame the less 
fortunate to a higher extent than the average; we did not experience this two years ago.
The last question concerning parties was what comes to mind for the respondents about 
the parties. We did not give options; here the students could free-associate (the questions 
were open-ended). 
Table 36. 
How well parties are known and associations made in connection with them (percentages)
Fidesz Jobbik MSZP LMP DK Együtt PM
I don’t 
know 
them
5 5 12 17 34 36 55
Can’t 
think of 
anything
9 14 10 11 17 17 17
Knows 
them, 
answer 
could 
not be 
evaluated
87 82 78 72 50 47 29
Positive 
mentions
they want 
to do good, 
acceptable, 
normal
Patriot, 
national, 
order
- Honest, balanced
Willingness 
to comp-
romise, 
freedom
Have a 
chance, 
encouraging, 
possibility
Youthful, 
faithful 
to their 
views
Negative 
mentions
They steal, 
dictatorship, 
discredited
Extremist, 
racist (23 
mentions 
compared 
to 41 two 
years ago)
Discredited, 
commies, 
“the past 
eight 
years”
Not serious, 
no chance, 
hippies/
homosexuals/
smoke weed
Discredited, 
not 
credible, 
commies, 
the Öszöd 
speech
No direction, 
uncertain, 
powerless
power- 
less
Source: Active Youth in Hungary Research Group, 2015 (own calculations).
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Concerning the statement that “crime is in ‘Gypsies’’ blood” the higher value means 
agreement; therefore, a positive answer here increases the odds of voting for Jobbik. 
Concerning political labels, the above 1 number increases the odds of voting for a party 
and the below 1 number decreases it. For foreign study, the smaller number means that 
the student has such experience; therefore, LMP performed better among those who had 
studied abroad.
The Nagelkerke R2 values of the first line mean to what extent the whole model explains 
the standard deviation of voting for a party. The values seem strong enough within the 
political sociological standards, aside from those for LMP, which counts as only a medi-
um-strength model. The support for LMP can only be 31 per cent explained according to 
the variables used in this analysis. Identifying with the green label has the most robust 
effect: Green students are almost 15 times more likely to vote for the party than others. 
Aside from this, the rest of the variables once again underline the party’s left-wing nature: 
The student voters of LMP are more likely than average to be liberal, left-wing, those who 
reject the statement that “crime is in the blood of Roma people”, and those who prefer 
democracy to dictatorship. Their main source of information is Origo. 
The variables appearing at Jobbik corroborate the results gained from earlier studies. 
According to their results, the appeal of Jobbik is predominantly not in its policy initi-
atives or ideology, but in its subculture (reading kuruc.info, under 21-year-olds), in its 
protest-nature (dissatisfaction with the current workings of democracy), and in habitual, 
community-based identification with the party (radicalism, right-wing). Aside from being 
pro-order, it is based on condemning Roma people and affects not so much those who are 
impoverished, but rather first-generation college students. The shift towards becoming a 
people’s party is also shown by the fact that their supporters frequently watch the com-
mercial media news which give relatively small airtime to the party compared to its size.
The model fit best with Fidesz, and the main reason for this is that pro-government stu-
dents are much more satisfied with the workings of democracy than other students and 
(perhaps in relation to this) see their prospects for employment more positively than other 
students. As a result of their satisfaction, the loyals category fits them best. Besides re-
jecting the green and radical labels, they naturally place themselves to the right. Their 
avoidance of kuruc.info and their above-average consumption of public television are not 
surprising; what is surprising, however, is that they use Facebook the most. 
Among the left-wing parties’ followers there is a high chance we will find students who are 
better- situated (parents with diplomas, students currently employed). Besides this, they 
are more dissatisfied with democracy, watch public television less frequently and watch 
commercial news more. It is not surprising that they place themselves to the left and 
that an overwhelming majority of them reject pro-order and conservative labels. What is 
somewhat surprising is that they reject the green label as well.
Table 37. 
Logistic regression analysis of party supporters. 
Voting for the given party is the dependent variable.
Jobbik LMP Fidesz Left
Nagelkerke 
R2 0.424 0.31 0.485 0.419
Significant 
variables 
and odds 
ratios 
(Exp Beta)
Parents’ 
educational 
attainment
0.828 Green label 14.71 Green label 0.091
Christian 
Democrat, 
conservative, 
religious label
0.1
Under 21 1.662 Foreign studies 0.402 Employment 1.598
Pro-order 
label 0.039
Left-right 1.788 Left-right 0.75 Left-right 1.47 Green label 0.197
Moderate-
radical 1.264
Liberal-
conser-
vative
0.707 Moderate-radical 0.725
Parents’ 
educational 
attainment
1.299
Satisfaction 
with 
democracy
0.55
Demo-
cracy vs. 
Dictator-
ship
0.679
Satisfaction 
with 
democracy
4.524 Currently employed 1.694
Kuruc.info 0.36 Origo 1.654 Kuruc.info 2.435 Left-right 0.396
Commercial 
TV 0.64
Roma 
and 
crime
0.64 Facebook 0.626
Satisfaction 
with 
democracy
0.506
Roma and 
crime 1.472 Public TV 0.527
Commercial 
TV 0.508
Public TV 2.275
Dependent variable: Vote for a particular party. 
Source: Active Youth in Hungary Research Group, 2015 (own calculations).
An odds ratio above 1 increases the likelihood of a respondent voting for a party and an 
odds ratio less than 1 decreases the likelihood of a respondent voting for a party. Concern-
ing parental educational attainment, the higher value means a higher degree of education; 
therefore, Jobbik’s value below 1 means that the party is more popular among parents 
with lower levels of education. Concerning the under-21 variable, the higher value means 
that the respondent is under 21 years old and support for the party is higher amongst 
them. Concerning the left-right, liberal-conservative, moderate-radical scale, the higher 
level tended toward the right, the conservative and the radical: One unit move to the right 
on a scale of seven raises the odds of voting for Jobbik 1.788 times. Concerning satis-
faction with democracy, since the higher value means satisfaction, Jobbik supporters are 
more dissatisfied than average. Concerning media consumption, the higher value means 
more regular consumption; therefore, the below 1 odds ratio shows that the given channel 
increases the odds of party support, while the odds ration above 1 decreases it. Jobbik 
supporters use kuruc.info and public television news more frequently than others. 
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Just as we do not have a characteristicaly different green political profile, there is no 
specific female political preference either. We could see earlier as well that women chose 
LMP and the green label at above average rates and chose Jobbik in smaller proportions. 
More women are dedicated (51 per cent) to democracy as a political system than men (43 
per cent), women rather reject the leader cult and pro-order mentality, and naturally sup-
port women’s emancipation more. Further differences are more modest political interest 
among women and less regular news consumption, which is paired with a minimally lower 
propensity to vote and lower online/offline political activity. 
Table 39. 
Significant differences between the experiences and opinions of men and women 
(percentages within the individual genders)
Male Female
Studied abroad previously 9 13
Agrees: democracy is superior  
to all other political systems 43 51
Agrees: The country needs strong leaders,  
not political programmes 37 31
Agrees: Increased rigour is necessary for the protection of public order: 
Order is more important than criminals’ rights 59 53
Agrees: It is a man’s job to make money; the wife should deal with  
the children and the household 17 9
Will certainly refrain from voting 48 45
Source: Active Youth in Hungary Research Group, 2015 (own calculations).
Green orientation and gender aspects
In the final part of our analysis we look at two highlighted aspects of our essays: The 
relationship between green orientation, gender and students’ political views and public/
political activities. 
Concerning preference for the green political label, we can mainly say that there is only 
a very modest relationship with the variables that appeared in our survey: Our logistic 
regression model could only explain 13 per cent of the standard deviation. The most sig-
nificant result is exactly this lack of pronounced correlations. The only strong correlation 
was that women were 2.2 times as likely to choose this political identity. Aside from this, 
those students who were less interested in politics, saw their possibilities for employment 
as favourable, reject authoritarianism and pro-order ideology are accept green orienta-
tion somewhat more, but these effects are rather weak as well. The remaining variables 
concerning demographics, attitudes and public activities do not have a significant rela-
tionship with the choice of the green label. 
Table 38. 
Determinants of choosing the green political label (logistic regression analysis)
Identifying as green
Nagelkerke R2 0.134
Significant variables  
and odds ratios 
(Exp Beta)
Female 2.193
Employment 0.740
Political interest 0.784
Authoritarianism 0.757
Pro-order 1.416
A higher than 1 odds ratio increases the odds that the respondent will identify with the green 
label, while smaller than 1 will decrease the likelihood. Concerning employment, a higher value 
meant unfavourable possibilities. Therefore, those students were more likely to identify with the 
green label who saw their employment possibilities as favourable. Concerning interest in politics, 
the higher value means more intensive interest, so greens were more likely to come from those 
less interested in politics. Authoritarianism means agreement with the statement that “Children 
must learn that obedience and respect for authority is the most important.” Pro-order means 
agreement with the statement that: “Increased rigour is needed for the protection of public safety: 
Order is more important than the criminals’ rights.”
Source: Active Youth in Hungary Research Group, 2015 (own calculations).
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Chapter conclusion
Compared to the studies two and four years ago, we were enriched with several new in-
sights concerning party choices by university and college students. First we have to state 
that the formerly strong protest mood – voice – has become more dominant, and this 
significantly contributed to the increased support for Jobbik and LMP. Besides the move-
ments and subcultures behind the two parties (the kuruc.info and Critical Mass genera-
tions) the primary reason these parties were able to reach so many youth is because they 
are seen as fresh - they haven’t been in government before. In the countryside, Jobbik also 
collected many protest votes, while in larger cities those votes went to LMP. 
Habitual, emotional, community-identity motivations explain the attraction of these two 
new parties much more than ideological-policy reasons. On the one hand, we saw for 
questions concerning policy and value preferences that LMP’s audience is hardly different 
from the left-wing parties’ audience, while Jobbik’s is barely distinguishable from the 
Fidesz audience. On the other hand, in many cases we could find significant inconsisten-
cies between a party’s self-definition and ideology their voters’s ideologies. Among Jobbik 
supporters, many self-identified as liberal, green, moderate, or uncertain students (who 
therefore placed themselves in the middle of the different scales). Most Jobbik supporters 
do not inform themselves from kuruc.info, but rather from Facebook and public television 
news. LMP’s student support base is mostly liberal, Western, and left-wing, even though 
the party elite does not propagate these ideas at all. The positive associations concerning 
the party mainly had to do with the party’s clean record rather than its ideology.
The socio-demographic background of Jobbik and LMP reveals diversity as well: The only 
group among which LMP could not take root was religious students, whereas Jobbik did 
worse than average among women and older students with higher levels of training, but 
did manage to improve its positions even in those groups. Jobbik’s catch-all strategy and 
its success is most visible in the decrease of negative associations with it (Nazi, fascist, 
aggressive, etc.). 
As was the case two years ago, in 2015 Fidesz did the best among religious, relativelly 
well-off, privileged students who were optimistic about their careers. Naturally, they are 
the least dissatisfied with the system, although it is definitely a warning sign for the gov-
erning party that many who had a positive association with it said the party was “better 
than nothing”: Therefore, while Fidesz voters are loyal to both the party and the govern-
ment, there can be doubts about the durability and relentlessness of their loyalty. It is also 
a sign of concern for the government that the majority of pro-order students and those 
with strong national sentiments have been taken away from them by Jobbik. At the same 
time, it would be a mistake to think the “Tusványos generation” is passive: Generally they 
have the most organizational membership, they inform themselves the most from Face-
book, and their virtual (comments, shares) and actual (demonstrations, petitions) political 
activity does not lag behind other parties, which is somewhat surprising given that these 
are primarily opposition participation genres. All in all, Fidesz followers displayed bal-
anced, “omnivorous” media consumption and a similar extent of activity.  
Table 40. 
Command of language, possibilities for employment, political interest, organizational 
connections and online/offline activity according to gender
Male Female
Command of language 3.8 4.1
How certain do you see your future?  
(1=not certain at all; 5=very certain) 3.57 3.38
What are the possibilities for employment?  
(1=very unfavourable; 5=very favourable) 3.25 3.05
Political interest (1=not at all; 5=very interested) 2.85 2.58
Organizational connections 1.3 1.3
Offline activity 3 2.7
Online activity 1.8 1.5
left (1) – right (7) 4.41 4.18
liberal (1) – conservative (7) 3.79 3.65
moderate (1) –radical (7) 3.67 3.43
Note: language: In the case of each language we gave the following points 0=does not speak, 
1=basic, 2=intermediate, 4=advanced. This is our summary for the five languages we asked about.
Organizational connection: We asked about connections to 12 types of organizations.  
Those respondents received the maximum of 12 points who were members of all 12. On average, 
students are members of slightly more than one organization.  
See the descriptions of the specific types in the survey. 
Offline and online activity: We gave 14 offline and 6 online activities. The average points show how 
many activities the voters for each party participate in on average.  
See the descriptions in the survey.
Source: Active Youth in Hungary Research Group, 2015 (own calculations).
Compared to male students, women are slightly more left-wing, liberal and moderate; 
however, the difference can be seen much more in the fact that they chose the mean value 
(4) on the 1-7 scale in a higher proportion, which indicates uncertainty or even aversion 
towards the question. It is an interesting result that young women see their possibilities 
for employment more pessimistically than men their age do and are less confident con-
cerning their future, even though a greater proportion speak languages and have more 
experience abroad than men do.
Exit versus Voice 
On behalf of the Heinrich-Böll-Stiftung, our research group has examined in detail the 
potential for exit and voice among Hungarian university and college students, as well as 
what characterizes the world of political loyals and political indifferents (based on the 
theoretical framework of Albert O. Hirschman and his critics and followers). Practical 
testing of theory is exceptional within the international literature, and the testing phase 
that includes a longitudinal element in the analysis is especially unique. Of the questions 
and hypotheses described in the introduction, we have answered almost all of them in the 
separate subsections of this volume. However, the most important hypothesis could not be 
tested or addressed within the subsections, as first we had to review our own concepts and 
present what the most important processes are that we have found. 
In contrast with Hirschman, our main hypothesis is that students can protest and entertain 
the thought of exit at the same time, instead of either protesting or exiting. Ultimately we 
are searching for an answer to whether exit truly bars protest among university students 
as Hirschman states in his classic work, Exit, Voice, Loyalty. According to our thesis this 
is not so. The same layers protest that would be most likely to chose the potential option of 
exit. Political loyals, however, do not exit and only protest in certain, well-defined cases. 
As party or system supporters they cannot be placed in any of the main categories. We 
considered political indifferents to be such passive actors for whom politics has no value 
- they do not vote and are destructive, which presumably presents itself in their low po-
tential for exit as well. In this concluding chapter, therefore, we are not just mechanically 
summarizing ourr results, we are testing our main hypothesis. 
We gave an exact description of all four terms used by us in the introduction. As a re-
minder, exit, according to our interpretation (and in line with the international migration 
literature) is actually, permanently leaving the country. Voice (as with Hirschman) is 
collective, direct, democratic actioncapable of addressing students. We examined online 
and offline protest separately.
The 2013 and 2015 university and college surveys by our research group are both equal-
ly suitable for testing the above theses. We decided to present and compare the results 
reflecting on the main problem for both years, while the detailed analysis is done in ref-
erence to the year 2015. 
Recent political developments have led to a dramatic retreat by the left among univer-
sity and college students. Most indicators showed that only the most loyal supporters 
stayed with the parties; they disappeared almost completely from among rural students, 
first-generation college students, and poorer students. The fact that many university stu-
dents would be open to the values they represent also shows their spectacular failure. 
There are many left-wing, liberal, Western, anti-authoritarian, progressive university and 
college students, and many turned to LMP or even to Jobbik, but most are not able to 
choose a party at the moment. The quick rise and fall of Együtt-PM shows that university 
and college students are open to new parties. With sufficient resources and visibility it 
is possible to gain their sympathies. Primarily, this is not an ideological question, as the 
radical right wing Jobbik could become successful the same way that the Bajnai-run for-
mation representing its antithesis has, or LMP, which was once again near the “top” after 
2011, could become successful as well. It seems, however, that it is only possible to retain 
youth voters if the party keeps an equal distance from the parties youth voters are bored 
and fed up with, namely, Fidesz and MSZP.
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Exit and protest groups
Based on the relationship between exit and protest, four groups can be identified. 
The first group is made up of those who protest and exit, which make up a quarter of Hun-
garian university and college students. Besides planning to leave the country and settle 
permanently in another country, members of this group let their voice be heard in differ-
ent (offline) collective forms of protest (they sign petitions, demonstrate, boycott, etc.). 
The other clear-cut group is those who do not protest and do not wish to exit. They are al-
most as numerous as members of the first group (23 per cent). Close to half of Hungarian 
university and college students are made up of layers where the relation betwee exit and 
protest does not show up as one being considered the alternative of the other. 
The 36 per cent of Hungarian students who protest but do not think of exit are a more 
complex (mixed) group, while the remaining 17 per cent is the opposite of this, i.e., pas-
sive, but with potential for exit. Now we will look at the groups in further detail. 
Figure 5. 
Groups of voice and exit. (percentages)
Source: Active Youth in Hungary Research Group, 2013 and 2015 (own calculations). 
Does exit bar voice?
We can test the hypothesis of whether exit truly bars the development of voice – as Albert 
O. Hirschman states in his classic 1970 study – through relatively simple methods. In our 
series of studies we asked university students in 2013 and 2015 whether they plan to study 
abroad. Besides this, each year we created the variable of collective action by using the 
same group of variables. In 2013 and 2015, those who chose the option of exit, that is, 
the proportion of those who planned to settle abroad permanently, was 35 and 42 per cent 
respectively. Those who chose voice (collective actives)53 constituted 66 per cent in 2013, 
and in the spring of 2015, 59 . We can see from the data that the proportion of those who 
protested was significantly higher than those who chose exit. 
At the same time, no connection could be shown in a statistical sense between exit and 
voice. We could also say that exit and voice are independent of each other, and this is true 
for both years examined. This finding is supported by the result of the correlation analy-
sis54 carried out between the two groups, shown in the following Table55. Therefore, it is 
possible to protest without someone thinking about the possibility of exit and vice versa - 
the potential for exit is not correlated to the potential for protest. The answer to our main 
question is, therefore, that while exit does not prohibit voice, it is also not conducive to it. 
These processes are possible to discuss as happening in parallel. 
Table 41. 
The statistical relationship between those who exit and those who protest
2013 2015
Pearson Correlation -0.039 -0.039
Sig. (2-tailed) 0.177 0.300
Source: Active Youth in Hungary Research Group, 2013 and 2015 (own calculations). 
Following the results summarized above, it is worth examining the data in detail as well. 
We only carried out a detailed analysis concerning those choosing exit and voice on the 
2015 data, as the basic correlation between exit and voice is the same in both years. 
53. For reasons of simplicity we only included offline activity in our analysis.
54. It should be noted that other statistical processes, e.g. Pearsons Chi-Square probe, result in similar outcomes as well.
55. In a statistical sense it is absolutely unique for two independent so-called cross-sectional studies to have exactly the same 
correlation between two variables. 
Protest but
do not exit: 36%
Protest and
exit: 24%
Do not protest,
do not exit: 23%
Do not protest
but exit : 17%
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Table 42. 
Distribution of those who exit and protest (average values)
Groups that exit  
and protest left–right (1–7)
liberal–conservative 
(1–7)
moderate– 
radical (1–7)*
Do not exit, do not protest 4.4 3.9 3.4
Do not exit but protest 4.5 4.0 3.7
Exit but do not protest 4.3 3.6 3.5
Exit and protest 4.0 3.3 3.4
Total 4.3 3.7 3.5
left–right: F=6.258, Sig=0.000, eta=0.163. / liberal–conservative: F=7.993, Sig=0.000, eta=0.183.
* moderate-radical: F=2.246, Sig=0.082, eta=0.098. Non-significant correlation.
Source: Active Youth in Hungary Research Group, 2015 (own calculations).
What does the above-described relationship mean? It seems that since an identical, con-
sistent ideology connects the layers created by those who exit and/or protest, there might 
be a specific behaviour or mentality behind them. If we examine the groups based on 
political value labels, we can get closer to characterizing these layers. The following sta-
tistically significant data set shows that value choices behind exit/protest are like a model:
1. For European/Western and liberal youth (who are rather centre-left oriented) 
support for exit is clear; at the same time,both groups appear among those who 
protest and those who do not. In their case, exit and voice can be complemen-
tary. Consistent with ideological attitudes and value choice, a small number 
of left-wing voters are strongly overrepresented (this is highest among them) 
within the exit and protest groups, 32 % versus the 24 % of the sample average. 
In this case, the hypothesis we formulated in the introduction seems to be true, namely, that 
the actively protesting layers can also be layers that are actively thinking about potential exit. 
2. Those with strong national sentiments who are conservative and religious make up the 
opposite extremity. Perhaps their potential for protest is low due to their principles; 
however, certain sub-groups here may protest. When this happens depends (according 
to them) mainly on their party loyalty. The right-wing conservative, Christian youth 
tend to be Fidesz voters; therefore, their potential for protest is related to special is-
sues, to the actions of certain members of the civil network connected to Fidesz, or to 
earlier topics. Fidesz voters are significantly overrepresented among non-exit students: 
28 per cent of them are non-exit and non-protest, but a further 43 per cent have partic-
ipated in a collective protest at one time or another. Students with strong national sen-
timents, as well as pro-order youth, tend to vote for the radical opposition Jobbik party; 
therefore, their potential for protest seems to be higher. It is no accident that many 
Jobbik voters, 43 per cent, do not exit, but protest, that is, they do not want to leave 
the country because they identify as patriors, but have a voice and are an active layer. 
Most traditional socio-demographic dimensions do not explain inclusion in these separate 
groups, i.e., the dimensions of gender (it is worth noting that among women there are 
somewhat more who do not exit and do not protest), permanent address (there are more 
non-exit, non-protest students within villages), fathers’ educational attainment or view 
of the future and perceived future employment. Subjective perceptions of financial cir-
cumstances, however, are significant. According to our data, those students who are in a 
better financial situation can be found at above average rates in the “mixed” group, while 
those who are in a worse financial situation can be found more in the non-exit, non-protest 
groups. Members of the group that exit and protest are overrepresented among students 
who basically “make ends meet by budgeting well”. 
Institution type also seems to be an important aspect. Students at church-funded institu-
tions are highly overrepresented among the non-exit, non-protest group, but students at 
private institutions can be found in higher than the average proportions among those who 
exit but do not protest. Most students in Hungarian higher education attend state univer-
sities, these students seem to strengthen the groups of voice, be they exit or non-exit in 
nature. Last but not least, state-funded colleges (as opposed to state-funded universities) 
strengthen the group of those who chose to exit.
Based on the logic of the previous chapters, it is worth examining the relationship of the 
groups that exit and protest towards the democratic system56 and the political parties, 
as both factors play a significant role in the description of indifferents and loyals. Our 
analysis found the surprising result that, in itself, the relationship towards democracy and 
dictatorship (that is system loyalty, system indifference and system critique) did not influ-
ence the positions of exit and voice. The two dimensions are independent of one another. 
Perhaps it is safe to make the observation that among the group of students who do not 
exit but protest, system criticals have an above-average proportion.
As opposed to attitudes toward democracy, the two dimensions of positions along the ide-
ological spectrum have a strong correlation with the groups that chose to exit or protest. 
Based on the ideological position measured on a 1-7 scale,it seems that those who exit 
and protest are the most left-wing and most liberal, while the non-exiting but protest-
ing groups represent the other extremity and are the most right-wing and conservative. 
Students’ positions on the moderate-radical scale, however, surprisingly did not affect 
belonging to the groups of exit and voice. The groups that exit but do not protest basically 
follow the sample average, while the non-exit, non-protest groups move slightly to the 
right of the sample.  
56. The students can be placed in three categories: system loyals, those who accept democracy as the best political system; system 
indifferents, for whom all political systems are the same; and finally, system criticals, who can accept dictatorship instead of democracy 
under certain conditions.
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The study does not end with this volume. Due to the migrant crisis there is a marked 
increase in prejudice within the region, and – perhaps it is not an exaggeration – within 
Europe as a whole. It seems that partially for this reason, authoritarianism seems to be 
gaining in appreciation again in society. The political processes seem to be shifting in the 
authoritarian direction. It would be worth examining the roots of these processes that 
concern socialization. It may be a decisive step for this to take our cross-sectional studies 
to a higher level and make an attempt to start a new student panel study. 
In this case, we hold our statement to be valid concerning political loyals – political loy-
als do not leave the country and only protest in certain well-defined cases. We can see, 
however, that in the case of political loyals we have to make an important distinction, as 
political affiliation (more precisely, the government-opposition conceptual duo) intersects 
these clear categories. This is especially important to note concerning left and right-wing 
opposition. Those supporting left-wing opposition parties belong to the first category, 
while right-wing opposition voters can be found in the second category. 
3. The students who identify with green, environmentalist values are basically di-
vided equally; therefore, their characteristics are not completely clear and are 
difficult to define. At the same time, LMP voters strengthen the exit camp, be 
they those who exit and protest, or who exit but do not protest.
 Table 43. 
Distribution of those who exit and protest based on value labels  
(percentages among those who could give an answer)
 liberal, freethinking
European/
Western
Christian 
Democrat, 
religious
Conservative, 
traditionalist
Strong 
nationalist 
sentiments
Order 
and 
stability
Green
Non exit, non 
protest 22 8 11 13 11 16 13
Non exit, protest 21 12 16 6 11 18 13
Exit but do not 
protest 32 18 5 7 5 15 15
Exit and protest 34 21 4 4 5 15 14
Total 26 14 10 8 9 16 14
Pearson Chi-Square: 59.880; sig: 0.000. Cramer V: 0.169.
Source: Active Youth in Hungary Research Group, 2015 (own calculations).
The above analysis did not take into consideration one aspect: The group that we con-
sidered politically indifferent who we presumed did not commit themselves, were not in-
terested, do not vote, are destructive, and who we presumed to appear ata low level for 
potential exit. Within the four categories of voice and exit, indifferents appear (naturally) 
in just two groups: In the non-exit, non-protest group, and the exit, but non-protest group. 
The distribution of these two groups is interesting, however: 51 per cent of indifferents do 
not exit and do not protest, while 49 per cent exit despite protesting. That is, the assump-
tion that formulated indifferents as completely destructive was not completely accurate. 
Some indifferents can choose exit, while at the same time these groups visibly do not wish 
to participate in the forming the political system. 
Research methodology
This research has applied qualitative and quantitative methods of empirical social science 
research to this question. We did 10 in-depth interviews with Hungarian students linked 
to higher education studying abroad (at Austrian, German, Swiss and British campuses). 
The purpose was to investigate what they think of democracy and politics and what their 
motives are for studying abroad. Qualitative techniques were used to provide a more 
in-depth exploration of the relationships discovered. The interviews lasted 50 minutes 
onaverage. 
In July 2015 we also did 55 in-depth interviews with Hungarian university and college 
students with order to receive answer to the question of what they think about the concept 
of democracy.
Examinations of new issues and problems were also built into the second stage of our 
analysis within these interviews and focus group discussions. For example, during the 
empirical stage, student emigration and the permissive attitudes of youth towards dicta-
torship were closely examined.
In April 2015 an empirical survey was conducted utilizing a sample of 800 students. 
All people were asked to answer questions via face-to-face interviews. The face-to-face 
interviews took place in 35 institutions across Hungary. The aspects and considerations 
of weighting were:
· The composition of the institution’s faculty;
· The distribution of men and women within the faculty;
· The distribution of the levels of training within the institution and the faculty 
(university-college, BA, MA, undivided training, PhD).
The margin of error for the 800 person sample is ± 3.5 percentage points (with a 95 % 
confidence interval) in the course of examinin the submanifolds; however, the margin of 
error could be even higher.
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Two years have passed since the publication of the study “Political Orientations, Values 
and Activities of Hungarian University and College Students”, in which we analyzed the 
questions of whether in a democratic system a generation of new democrats could emerge, 
and to what extent Hungarian youth is committed to democracy as a system of rule. 
This current volume of the study further examines existing and new tendencies of 
Hungarian youth regarding their political choices and the reasons behind them. 
While previously only students who reside in the country were in the focus, the scope of this 
recent study has been extended to include the political involvement and attitudes of that part 
of the Hungarian youth who already are emigrating or are planning to soon move abroad. 
The title, “Exit, Voice, Loyalty and Neglect – Political Attitudes of Hungarian University 
and College Students” reflects a possible alignment of the various paths of political 
behavior observed within this generation.
What are the attitudes of youth in Hungary towards democracy, and how active are they 
in politics? What are their party preferences, and how involved are they with public life? 
Are they planning to leave the country, and if so, do they become less or more engaged 
with Hungarian politics from abroad? This study explores such questions and attempts 
to place the findings into a theoretical framework developed for this purpose using the 
categories of exit, voice, loyalty, and neglect, based on the terminology established by 
Albert O. Hirschman and his critics and followers.
We hope that the empirical findings of this study can help the work of policy-makers 
and other professionals who are committed to democratic values and are striving to find 
answers to the political challenges of the 21st century.
